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Public Funding for Sanitation: The many faces of sanitation subsidies 
foreword
There is no doubt that sanitation is one of the most significant development challenges of 
our time . Two and a half billion people do not have access to an ‘improved’ sanitary facility, 
over 700 million Indians are forced to defecate in the open, and in Africa the number 
of people without sanitation has actually grown in the past decade . There is growing 
evidence that it is the poorest people in the world who suffer the most, and it is poor 
families, and particularly poor children, who pay the price through illness, suffering and 
thousands of early, preventable deaths . 
In 2005 The Millennium Task Force on Sanitation called for stronger institutions and 
better financing for sanitation; better financing including both more money and better 
ways of spending money . However, working out what needs to be done is not easy . 
There are many calls on the public purse and even within sanitation it is often difficult to 
decide on priorities . What is more important? Sewerage connections in this urban slum, 
or more latrines in that remote village? Wastewater treatment for this crowded and 
polluted city or more health extensionists in the districts? Even where agreement can be 
reached there is often just not enough money to do everything that seems to be needed .
The Water Supply and Sanitation Collaborative Council is responding to the challenge in a 
number of ways . The newly launched Global Sanitation Fund seeks to engage proactively 
on the ground in countries where there is an agreed plan and consensus on what needs 
to be done, but where funds are scarce . The GSF finances gaps in sector plans with a 
particular focus on activities that can increase the use of communities’ and households’ 
own potential and resources . GSF works closely with national governments and sector 
stakeholders to finance key activities in hygiene promotion, sanitation marketing and 
other critical ‘software’ aspects of sanitation . 
But WSSCC also contributes in other ways; supporting networks at the national level and 
acting as a clearinghouse and source of reliable, unbiased information with a focus on 
people-centred solutions . It is in this light that WSSCC has prepared this primer, Public 
Funding for Sanitation: The many faces of sanitation subsidies . Responding to requests 
from our National WASH Coalitions, we have pulled together the latest thinking and 
knowledge on sanitation financing and focused particularly on the sometimes-heated 
topic of sanitation subsidies . This document is a resource for all those who work in 
sanitation and who seek sustainable and effective strategies for delivering sanitation to 
those who need it most .
The need for more and better sanitation is clear; the need for more and better funding 
follows . We hope that this primer is a valuable tool towards meeting the challenges 
ahead . 
Jon	Lane
Executive Director, WSSCC
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Public Funding for Sanitation: The many faces of sanitation subsidies 
inTroducTion 
BackgrouND To THE DIscussIoN 
It	is	well	known	that	very	many	people	(upwards	of	2 .5	billion)	do	not	have	access	to	
‘improved’	sanitation .	Instinctively	we	also	know	that	it	is	the	poorest	who	are	worst	
affected,	and	a	recent	study	of	access	to	sanitation	in	africa	confirms	this	(Figure	1) .
Clearly	action	is	needed,	and	a	key	element	in	making	progress	is	the	need	for	both	
more	money	and	better	targeting	of	that	money	to	achieve	improvements	which	
benefit	the	poor .	This	document	is	an	introduction	to	part	of	the	discussion	about	
financing	for	sanitation	and	has	a	particular	focus	on	the	thorny	issue	of	sanitation	
subsidies .
Historically,	in	now-industrialized	nations,	funding	for	sanitation	was	provided	by	
central	and	local	governments,	local	industry	and	philanthropists .	Such	funding	was	
usually	provided	to	stimulate	the	provision	of	public	sanitation	services	in	dense	
industrialized	urban	settlements	in	the	interests	of	public	health	and,	to	some	extent,	
for	philanthropic	reasons .	The	typical	pattern	of	provision	saw	local	authorities	
providing	mains,	sewers	or	dry	sanitation	systems,	storm	water	drainage	and	
solid	waste	management	services .	Provision	of	in-house	facilities	was	either	left	to	
individual	households	or	landlords,	with	some	enforcement	of	legislation	to	encourage	
this	investment,	or	also	provided	through	public	finance	(Hamlin,	1951,	Hamlin	and	
Sheard,	1998	and	Eveleigh,	2002) .	once	urban	areas	were	fully	covered,	systems	
expanded	outwards	into	rural	areas,	although	generally	with	a	lower	level	of	public	
finance  .	In	most	of	the	industrialized	world	today,	coverage	with	hygienic	sanitation	
is	universal	and	enforced	with	legislation .
Globally,	however,	access	to	basic	sanitation	is	still	grossly	insufficient .	More	than	
2 .5	billion	people	alive	today	still	need	to	gain	this	access,	while	population	growth	
and	the	deterioration	of	existing	sanitation	systems	means	that	countless	more	will	
need	to	be	served	as	well .	
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Source:  Morella et al. 2008 
figure 1: access to sanitation by income quintile (percentage of population using)
WHAT NEEdS To BE FiNANCEd?
////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
The total cost of a sanitation programme comprises:
w	 Supporting	and	developing	an	enabling	environment:	
These could include expenditures linked to policy 
development, capacity building, knowledge sharing or 
coordination . However, it may be difficult to estimate 
those costs other than by taking a percentage of 
overhead costs for staff working on policy development 
at the sector level, either within the Government or 
within donors .
w	 Hygiene	behaviour	change	activities: This would 
include hygiene education and mobilization activities 
in schools, communities and households, social 
marketing for handwashing with soap, interventions in 
the design of school curricula and teacher training, etc .
w	 Sanitation	marketing	costs: market assessments, 
demand promotion, costs of community-led total 
sanitation activities, interventions to stimulate supply 
of appropriate goods and services (e .g . training or 
financial support to private providers), etc .
w	 Cost	of	public	infrastructure	and	services	(capital	
and	operational	costs)	of for example schools, public 
toilets, shared network services; and
w	 Cost	of	private	infrastructure	and	services	(capital	
and	operational	costs) of household sanitation .
Adequate funding is needed for all the elements of the 
programme . For example, if investments are urgently 
needed in sanitation for schools, public latrines in market 
places, and hygiene promotion programmes, these are 
areas which, almost by definition, need financial support 
from public sources or explicit policy support to generate 
private funding (for privately constructed and managed 
public latrines, for example) . 
In addition the long-term or	lifespan	financing of 
sanitation is critically important . While much debate 
focuses on provision of new toilets the real challenge is in 
ensuring that they are properly used and managed in the 
long run .
Only once the financial structure of the whole programme 
over the long term has been established, will it be 
possible to judge whether financial support to household 
investments is appropriate or can be provided from 
available sources .
At the same time sanitation goods and services may be 
provided by a range of different providers including:
w	 central government;
w regional/local/urban government;
w large scale private sector;
w the community (often with support from an NGO or 
CBO);
w small-scale private sector; and
w the household through direct provision 3 .
To avoid distorting existing arrangements for service 
provision which may be working very well, the design of 
public financing of sanitation also needs to be cognizant 
of these multiple service providers and not assume that 
all provision is taking place in the public sector .
WHERE do THE FUNdS CoME FRoM?
////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
The funds for the provision of sanitation goods and 
services come from only three sources:
w	 Public	funds, flowing through central or local 
government and raised through general taxation, 
public borrowing and ODA;
w  Private	funds, flowing directly between beneficiary 
households and service providers; and
w  Semi-public/charitable	fundsflowing in the form 
of payments made to communities, households or 
service providers by donors, foundations and other 
non-governmental organizations . 
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Given that many of those who lack access are extremely 
poor and given the public health benefits of universal 
access to sanitation, public funding to increase access 
seems an obvious policy response (see for example Hall 
and Lobina, 2009) . However, many commentators have 
suggest d that public subsidies have fail   significantly 
incr ase acc ss and may indeed have stifled ervice 
provision (Cair cr ss, 2004, Brook and Smith, 200 
and Foster e  al ., 2000) . Others suggest that th re are 
insufficient public fund  to add ess the global sanitation 
crisis, so discussion of subsidies is little more tha  a 
distraction (Mehta, 2003, and Lenton et al ., 2005) or 
that inadequate targeting means that the poor do not 
benefit (Cairncross, 2004) . With he notable exception of 
a few serious efforts to nalyse the impacts of subs dies, 
ma y of which are cited here, the argument is often 
heated and rarely dra s on emp rical evidence .
PURPoSE ANd AUdiENCE FoR THE 
PRiMER
////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
The purpose of this primer is to assist the reader to 
under and the global debate on subsidies and sanitation 
financing and t  provide ome guid nce on how to select 
the most appropriate funding arrangements in different 
situations .
In addition the primer aims to clarify the termin logy and 
language used in the debate about public financing of 
sanitation and sub idi s in particular . 
Whil  the dec sion to write this primer came from a 
desire by the WSSCC Secretariat to ssist the WSSCC
National WASH Coalition members and their partners in 
their discus i ns on financing mechanisms, he primer 
was written for everyone interested in informed debate
on this topic . The intention is to guide the reader through 
the debates and point the way to more detailed literature . 
SCoPE
////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
Sanitation
Sanitation in its broadest sense is the collection, 
transport, treatment and disposal or reuse of human 
excreta, domestic wastewater and solid waste, and 
associated hygiene promotion . Because of the primary 
risk to public health of human excreta in the environment, 
the focus of this publication will be on the provision of 
“Basic	Sanitation” as defined by the United Nations for 
the International Year of Sanitation Communications 
Strategy: the disposal of human excreta to prevent 
disease and safeguard privacy and dignity .
Effective management of human excreta however goes 
beyond the provision of infrastructure to its long-term 
effective use, operation and maintenance . In ru al areas 
this can generally be managed within the sphere of 
the househol  or the local community but supporting 
activi ies (softw re) will be needed . In u ban areas 
long-term management of sanitation usually requires 
engagement with the wider urban system . In urban 
areas consideration of fina cing of sanitation therefore 
encompasses regulatory institutions, the organisation 
and management of urban collection, treatment and re-
use/disposal systems as well as the users . 
This document addr sses provision of basic sanitation in 
both rural and urban contexts and therefore includes a 
consideration of financing for both on-site sanitation and 
networked s werag  in urban areas but stops short of a 
full discussion f water/sanitation utility financing . 
Subsidy
In econo ics, a subsidy (also known as a subvention) 
is a f rm f financial assista ce paid to an individual, 
a business or an economic sector in order to achieve 
certain policy objectives . For example, a subsidy can be 
used to support businesses that might otherwise fail, or to 
encourage activities that would otherwise not take place 2 .
This definition implies that any financing for sanitation 
which does not flow directly from the immediately-
benefiting household to the service provider can be 
defined as a subsidy . Subsidies for sanitation flow almost 
exclusively from government, or via government in the 
case of Of icial Development Assistance (ODA), and 
sometimes through international non-governmental 
organizations (INGOs) or national non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) . Most of the discussion in this 
document will focus on overnment or public fund ng 
from a variety of sources . 
While the arguments described in the debate hereafter 
are ma nly focus d on infrastruct re (hardw re) 
subsidies, there are many differe t ways in which public 
money flows into the sanitation sector – through salaries 
of health extensionists, operational subsidies to urban 
utilities, artificially lowered connection fees, and so on . 
Many of these financial flows are not generally called 
subsidies, especially where they deal with ongoing costs 
such as staff salaries . The main premise of this document 
is that to understand one type of subsidy (the subsidised 
provision of hardware) it is essential to understand 
the entire pattern of public financial assistance to the 
sector . In	an	environment	of	scarce	public	money	the	
question	is	not	about	hardware	subsidies	but	about	the	
best	possible	allocation	of	public	funds	to	the	entire	
sanitation	value	chain . 
Other terms used in this document are defined in the 
Glossary .
WHAT NEEdS To BE FiNANCEd?
////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
The total cost of a sanitation programme comprises:
w	 Supporting	and	developing	an	enabling	environment:	
These could include expenditures linked to policy 
development, capacity building, knowledge sharing or 
coordination . However, it may be difficult to estimate 
those costs other than by taking a percentage of 
overhead costs for staff working on policy development 
at the sector level, either within the Government or 
within donors .
w	 Hygiene	behaviour	change	activities: This would 
include hygiene education and mobilization activities 
in schools, communities and households, social 
marketing for handwashing with soap, interventions in 
the design of school curricula and teacher training, etc .
w	 Sanitation	marketing	costs: market assessments, 
demand promotion, costs of community-led total 
sanitation activities, interventions to stimulate supply 
of appropriate goods and services (e .g . training or 
financial support to private providers), etc .
w	 Cost	of	public	infrastructure	and	services	(capital	
and	operational	costs)	of for example schools, public 
toilets, shared network services; and
w	 Cost	of	private	infrastructure	and	services	(capital	
and	operational	costs) of household sanitation .
Adequate funding is needed for all the elements of the 
programme . For example, if investments are urgently 
needed in sanitation for schools, public latrines in market 
places, and hygiene promotion programmes, these are 
areas which, almost by definition, need financial support 
from public sources or explicit policy support to generate 
private funding (for privately constructed and managed 
public latrines, for example) . 
In addition the long-term or	lifespan	financing of 
sanitation is critically important . While much debate 
focuses on provision of new toilets the real challenge is in 
ensuring that they are properly used and managed in the 
long run .
Only once the financial structure of the whole programme 
over the long term has been established, will it be 
possible to judge whether financial support to household 
investments is appropriate or can be provided from 
available sources .
At the same time sanitation goods and services may be 
provided by a range of different providers including:
w	 central government;
w regional/local/urban government;
w large scale private sector;
w the community (often with support from an NGO or 
CBO);
w small-scale private sector; and
w the household through direct provision 3 .
To avoid distorting existing arrangements for service 
provision which may be working very well, the design of 
public financing of sanitation also needs to be cognizant 
of these multiple service providers and not assume that 
all provision is taking place in the public sector .
WHERE do THE FUNdS CoME FRoM?
////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
The funds for the provision of sanitation goods and 
services come from only three sources:
w	 Public	funds, flowing through central or local 
government and raised through general taxation, 
public borrowing and ODA;
w  Private	funds, flowing directly between beneficiary 
households and service providers; and
w  Semi-public/charitable	fundsflowing in the form 
of payments made to communities, households or 
service providers by donors, foundations and other 
non-governmental organizations . 
>> 7
Public Funding for Sanitation: The many faces of sanitation subsidies 
STRUCTURE oF THE PRiMER
////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
The primer is laid out in five main parts:
Part	1, ‘How does Public Funding of Sanitation Work?’, 
discusses what needs to be financed and the sources 
of financing for sanitation programmes as a whole and 
examines in some more detail what is meant by public 
finance and subsidy . It introduces some broad concepts 
and principles by which public funds can be allocated . 
 
Part	2, ‘The Debate on Sanitation Subsidies’, examines 
briefly why there is so much discussion on subsidies in 
sanitation . It summarizes the main arguments ‘for’ and 
‘against’ subsidies (particularly hardware subsidies) and 
where possible points the reader to additional reading . 
Finally, it gives more details on the general principles 
w ich c n promote good financial design of sanitation 
programmes . 
Part	3, ‘Types of S bsidies’, touch  on financing for 
software activities . It goes on to describ  th ten types of 
hardware subsidies that are commonly used in anit tion 
and bri fly examines t e advantages and disadvantages 
of each along with s me examples of their application . 
Part	4, ‘Smart Financing of Sanitation Systems’, takes 
four generic sanitation systems (covering pretty much 
all the available technical options) and explores what are 
the real-life options for financing both their capital and 
operational costs . Privat , public and blended fin ncing 
are considered in each case .
Part	5, ‘Principles for Improving the Design of Subsidies’, 
summarizes the options and arguments and concludes 
by r iterating some general principles on making 
financing f r san tation eff ctive .
A glossary, references, b bliography and notes are 
appended .
A NoTE oN SoURCES ANd dATA
////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
Many of the commentators who have provided valuable 
feedback to this document asked why there weren’t more 
examples in the text of the types of subsidies we describe 
and of their effects . In particular we were asked why we 
did not cite many studies showing cases where targeted 
hardware subsidies have been effective . As mentioned 
above a review of the literature reveals a depressing 
lack of well-structured evaluations of sanitation subsidy 
schemes . There is much anecdotal evidence but little 
hard data . Notable exceptions are the work of Foster, 
Gomez-Lobo, Halpern, Cairncross, Brocklehurst and 
Janssens . Valuable synthesis has been done by Mehta, 
Sugde  and Jenkins . 
The Water and Sanitation Program is currently 
completing a s x-country study that is gat ering det iled 
info mati  on a number of sanitat on financing 
arrang ments including various forms of subsidy . The 
study by Sophie Trémolet, Eddy Perez and P te Kolsky 
entitled ‘Finan ing Household Sanitation for the Poor, A 
Global Six Country Comparative Review and Analysis’ is 
scheduled to be published later in 2009 . 
It is hoped that this document will encourage more 
analysis of the effects of sanitation financing regimes .
WHAT NEEdS To BE FiNANCEd?
////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
The total cost of a sanitation programme comprises:
w	 Supporting	and	developing	an	enabling	environment:	
These could include expenditures linked to policy 
development, capacity building, knowledge sharing or 
coordination . However, it may be difficult to estimate 
those costs other than by taking a percentage of 
overhead costs for staff working on policy development 
at the sector level, either within the Government or 
within donors .
w	 Hygiene	behaviour	change	activities: This would 
include hygiene education and mobilization activities 
in schools, communities and households, social 
marketing for handwashing with soap, interventions in 
the design of school curricula and teacher training, etc .
w	 Sanitation	marketing	costs: market assessments, 
demand promotion, costs of community-led total 
sanitation activities, interventions to stimulate supply 
of appropriate goods and services (e .g . training or 
financial support to private providers), etc .
w	 Cost	of	public	infrastructure	and	services	(capital	
and	operational	costs)	of for example schools, public 
toilets, shared network services; and
w	 Cost	of	private	infrastructure	and	services	(capital	
and	operational	costs) of household sanitation .
Adequate funding is needed for all the elements of the 
programme . For example, if investments are urgently 
needed in sanitation for schools, public latrines in market 
places, and hygiene promotion programmes, these are 
areas which, almost by definition, need financial support 
from public sources or explicit policy support to generate 
private funding (for privately constructed and managed 
public latrines, for example) . 
In addition the long-term or	lifespan	financing of 
sanitation is critically important . While much debate 
focuses on provision of new toilets the real challenge is in 
ensuring that they are properly used and managed in the 
long run .
Only once the financial structure of the whole programme 
over the long term has been established, will it be 
possible to judge whether financial support to household 
investments is appropriate or can be provided from 
available sources .
At the same time sanitation goods and services may be 
provided by a range of different providers including:
w	 central government;
w regional/local/urban government;
w large scale private sector;
w the community (often with support from an NGO or 
CBO);
w small-scale private sector; and
w the household through direct provision 3 .
To avoid distorting existing arrangements for service 
provision which may be working very well, the design of 
public financing of sanitation also needs to be cognizant 
of these multiple service providers and not assume that 
all provision is taking place in the public sector .
WHERE do THE FUNdS CoME FRoM?
////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
The funds for the provision of sanitation goods and 
services come from only three sources:
w	 Public	funds, flowing through central or local 
government and raised through general taxation, 
public borrowing and ODA;
w  Private	funds, flowing directly between beneficiary 
households and service providers; and
w  Semi-public/charitable	fundsflowing in the form 
of payments made to communities, households or 
service providers by donors, foundations and other 
non-governmental organizations . 
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How does Public funding of 
saniTaTion work?
P rt 1:
WHAT NEEdS To BE FiNANCEd?
////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
The total cost of a sanitation programme comprises:
w	 Supporting	and	developing	an	enabling	 nvironment:	
These could include expenditure linked to policy 
developmen , capacity building, knowledge sharing or 
coordination . However, it may be difficul  to estimate 
those costs other than by taking a percentage of 
overhead costs for taff wo king on policy development 
t the sector level, ei her within the government or 
within donors .
Hygiene	behaviour	change	activitie : This would 
include hygiene education and mobilization activities 
in schools, communities and households, social 
mark ting for handwashing with soap, interventions in 
the design of school curricula and teacher t aining, etc .
w	 Sanitation	marketing	costs: Ma ket assessm nts, 
demand pro tion, costs of community-led total 
sanitation activities, interventions to stimulate supply 
of appropriate goods and services (  .g . training or 
financial support to private providers), etc .
w	 Cost	of	pub ic	infrastructure	and	services	(capital	
and	 peration l	costs)	of for example schools, public 
toil ts, shared network services; and
w	 Cost	of	private	infrastructure	and	services	(capital	
and	operational	costs) of household sanitation .
Adequate funding is needed for all the elements of the 
programme . For example, if investments are urgently 
needed in sanitation for schools, public latrines in market 
places, and hygiene promotion programmes, these are 
areas which, almost by definition, need financial support 
from public sources or explicit policy support to generate 
private funding (for privately constructed and managed 
public latrines, for example) . 
In addition the long-term or	lifespan	financing of 
sanitation is critically important . While much debate 
focuses on provision of new toilets the real challenge is in 
ensuring that they are properly used and managed in the 
long run .
Only once the financial structure of the whole programme 
over the long term ha  been established, will it be 
ossible to judge whether financial support to household 
investments is appropri te or can b  provid d from 
available sources .
At the same time sanitation goods and services may be 
provided by a range of different providers including:
w	 central government;
w regional/local/urban government;
w large-scale private sector;
w the community (often with support from an NGO or CBO);
w small-scale private sector; and
w the household through direct provision 3 .
To avoid distorting existing arrang ments for service 
provision which may be working very well, the design of 
public f nancing of sanitation also needs to be cognizant 
of these multiple service providers and not assume that 
all pro ision is taking place in the public sector .
WHERE do THE FUNdS CoME FRoM?
////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
The funds for the provision of sanitation goods and 
services come from only three sources:
w	 Public	funds, flowing through central or local 
government and raised through general taxation, 
public borrowing and ODA;
w  Private	funds, flowing directly between beneficiary 
households and service providers; and
w  Semi-public/charitable	funds,	flowing in the form 
of payments made to communities, households or 
service providers by donors, foundations and other 
non-governmental organizations . 
WHAT NEEdS To BE FiNANCEd?
////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
The total cost of a sanitation programme comprises:
w	 Supporting	and	developing	an	enabling	environment:	
These could include expenditures linked to policy 
development, capacity building, knowledge sharing or 
coordination . However, it may be difficult to estimate 
those costs other than by taking a percentage of 
overhead costs for staff working on policy development 
at the sector level, either within the Government or 
within donors .
w	 Hygiene	behaviour	change	activities: This would 
include hygiene education and mobilization activities 
in schools, communities and households, social 
marketing for handwashing with soap, interventions in 
the design of school curricula and teacher training, etc .
w	 Sanitation	marketing	costs: market assessments, 
demand promotion, costs of community-led total 
sanitation activities, interventions to stimulate supply 
of appropriate goods and services (e .g . training or 
financial support to private providers), etc .
w	 Cost	of	public	infrastructure	and	services	(capital	
and	operational	costs)	of for example schools, public 
toilets, shared network services; and
w	 Cost	of	private	infrastructure	and	services	(capital	
and	operational	costs) of household sanitation .
Adequate funding is needed for all the elements of the 
programme . For example, if investments are urgently 
needed in sanitation for schools, public latrines in market 
places, and hygiene promotion programmes, these are 
areas which, almost by definition, need financial support 
from public sources or explicit policy support to generate 
private funding (for privately constructed and managed 
public latrines, for example) . 
In addition the long-term or	lifespan	financing of 
sanitation is critically important . While much debate 
focuses on provision of new toilets the real challenge is in 
ensuring that they are properly used and managed in the 
long run .
Only once the financial structure of the whole programme 
over the long term has been established, will it be 
possible to judge whether financial support to household 
investments is appropriate or can be provided from 
available sources .
At the same time sanitation goods and services may be 
provided by a range of different providers including:
w	 central government;
w regional/local/urban government;
w large scale private sector;
w the community (often with support from an NGO or 
CBO);
w small-scale private sector; and
w the household through direct provision 3 .
To avoid distorting existing arrangements for service 
provision which may be working very well, the design of 
public financing of sanitation also needs to be cognizant 
of these multiple service providers and not assume that 
all provision is taking place in the public sector .
WHERE do THE FUNdS CoME FRoM?
////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
The funds for the provision of sanitation goods and 
services come from only three sources:
w	 Public	funds, flowing through central or local 
government and raised through general taxation, 
public borrowing and ODA;
w  Private	funds, flowing directly between beneficiary 
households and service providers; and
w  Semi-public/charitable	fundsflowing in the form 
of payments made to communities, households or 
service providers by donors, foundations and other 
non-governmental organizations . 
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Gaps in sector finances are sometimes also filled 
by	market-based funding through micro finance 
organizations, banks and commercial service providers . 
By and large the funds flowing into the sector from 
market-based sources will all be recouped ultimately 
from individual households through repayment of loans 
or the spreading (amortising) of costs (for example 
by charging a small amount on every monthly water 
bill) or from the public sector through writing off or 
guaranteeing debt .
In non-social sectors (pay-to-view television provides a 
good example), payment for goods and services passes 
directly from the benefiting household to the service 
providers . In other words, all the finance is private . 
Several service providers may be involved; a shop who 
sells the TV and a satellite or cable provider who delivers 
the service into the house but payment for all their 
services is made by the househ ld . Co mercial service 
providers may inject their own funds in the form of 
advertising and other marketing activities such as ‘free’ 
installation, in order to increase their market share .
In a complicated social sector such as sanitation, by 
contrast, the sources and channels through which funds 
flow may be much more complex and at least some of 
the financing comes from public or semi-public sources . 
PRiNCiPlES FoR BRoAd 
AlloCATioNS oF CoST 4
/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
It i  the job of  policy maker (in wh tever form and
in consultation with others) to consider how grant and 
concessionary funding (available domestically or through 
external support mechanisms) and other public money 
Table 1: Nature and Incidence of Benefits
ElEmENT of 
a saNITaTIoN 
ProgrammE
NaTurE aND INcIDENcE 
of BENEfITs
PoTENTIal rEsourcEs from
Household/
community
Market-based 
resources (private 
and borrowing)
Public
Enabling 
EnvironmEnt
largely public due to improved 
efficiency of public spending
Helps to leverage household and 
market-based resources
Government funds 
(mainly national) and 
some international 
support
Promoting 
hygiEnE 
bEhaviours
Public and private due to 
community-wide health benefits 
and improvements in health at 
the household level 
Helps to leverage uptake of 
sanitation
Some private 
resources from soa  
manufacturers and 
suppliers
Government funds 
(local) and NGo/
donor projects
local funds for health 
extension workers, 
promotion etc.
sanitation 
markEting
largely public due to increased 
demand, greater uptake and 
supply of more appropriate 
anita ion technologies
Some private 
resources from 
sanitary-service 
suppliers (i.e. for 
advertising, R&d, etc.) 
Government funds 
(central and local) 
for enterprise 
development etc.
local funds for health 
extension workers, 
promotion etc.
Costs of PubliC 
infrastruCturE 
and sErviCEs
locally public - health benefits 
to wider community, improved 
school attendance and 
attainment
User charges for 
public/community 
sanitation and for 
access to e.g, urban 
sewerage
Some private funds 
for investments in 
pay-to-use public 
facilities, etc. ;  market 
-based borrowing 
may be possible for 
public facilities (B ild, 
operate, Transfer 
schemes (BoTs) and 
concessions etc.)
Central/ local 
government funds 
for sewerage, school 
sanitation, hospitals, 
clinics etc.
Costs of 
PrivatE 
infrastruCturE 
d sErviCEs 
Blend of private benefits to 
households (improved health 
and convenience) and public 
health benefits from no open 
defecation
Household and 
community capital 
and operational costs
Borrowing from 
MFis/housing fi ance 
organizations may be 
available
Central/local 
governm nt funds 
may be available
>> 0
>> Part : How Does Public Funding of Sanitation Work?
can be most effectively harnessed to support sanitation 
often within the context of wider poverty-reduction goals . 
The ultimate scale and nature of the sanitation 
programme should be decided on this basis and not in 
isolation . Since public money is scarce this decision is 
highly critical . While it is important to know something of 
the details of the technical solutions to be used, general 
principles must also be established .
It may be useful to take as a starting point the principle 
that the most efficient use of public funds is to maximize 
public benefits (those that are shared by everyone) . The 
corollary of this is that public funds should not be used 
to finance essentially private elements (such as soap, 
individual latrines, etc) for which people are willing and 
able to pay when private or market-based funds are 
available .
From Table	1 we can see that the elements of the 
sanitation programme fall into two groups . The first 
group, consisting of the enabling environment, promotion 
of hygiene behaviours and sanitation marketing, are often 
grouped together as ‘software’ activities . The second 
group, public and private infrastructure and services, 
are often grouped together as ‘hardware’ . The software 
grouping has benefits that are largely public and there 
seems to be limited potential to levy funds for these from 
household sources (except via general taxation and the 
public budget) . The hardware grouping has a mix of public 
and private benefits and the potential to levy funding 
directly from users (households) is higher . 
Working from the principles outlined above, this 
suggests that public funding for ‘software’ is relatively 
easy to justify . What is more challenging is to decide to 
what extent public money can be used to finance the 
‘hardware’ with its blend of public and private benefits . 
In the next section we turn our attention to the general 
debate on subsidies in the sanitation sector to try to 
understand why the topic results in such heated debate .
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WHY THE dEBATE?
////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
Most governments and many organisations – including 
WSSCC – aim to support the poor and vulnerable to 
obtain sanitation services in ways that promote social 
equity, are people-centred and participatory . Most people 
would agree that there are strong reasons why people 
should not live in filthy and unhealthy environments . 
For many people it is a short leap from there to a strong 
argument for the use of hardware subsidies . This is 
based on two assumptions: firstly that it is lack of funds 
that forms the primary barrier to access for the poorest, 
and secondly that the use of hardware subsidies is 
an effective way of removing this barrier . Given that 
people understand the word ‘subsidy’ in many different 
ways it starts to become clear how these non-explicit 
assumptions can lead to disagreements . 
To try to bring some clarity, the section below lays out the 
main arguments for sanitation subsidies and the main 
reasons why some people advocate against them . 
In the main most of this discussion relates to subsidized 
provision of hardware (including the construction and 
operation of collection and treatment facilities, pipes and 
toilets) but as we have already discussed, it is important 
to consider these arguments also within the wider 
framework of overall financing for the sector . 
THE CASE FoR iMPRoViNG 
SANiTATioN
////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
There is little disagreement on the need to improve 
sanitation coverage . The main arguments include: 
Environmental arguments 
Poor sanitation has a negative impact on the environment 
both at the local level and in downstream ecosystems . 
Contamination of water supplies by untreated waste can 
limit their safety and sustainability . It can also result in 
environmental degradation . 
Societal and public health arguments 
The potential economic benefits of investments in 
sanitation are well documented and include public health 
improvements, increased attendance and attainment at 
school, improved economic productivity, and increased 
security, particularly for women although such benefits 
are sometimes difficult to achieve or sustain . These 
benefits, along with fundamental improvements in dignity 
and comfort are felt by all members of society but 
particularly women and children (WSSCC, 2006) .
Political obligations 
Many governments have also signed up to a range 
of poverty reduction goals, including the Millennium 
Development Goals, regional commitments such as 
the eThekwini Declaration in Sub Saharan Africa, and 
national Poverty Reduction Strategic Plans, all of which 
place some responsibility on governments to improve 
access to sanitation . Indeed the influence of improved 
sanitation on all of the Millennium Development Goals is 
well documented (Lenton et al ., 2005) .
THE CASE FoR SANiTATioN SUBSidiES
///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
Having acknowledged the strong arguments to improve 
sanitation access, the next step is to consider how best 
this can be achieved . Below we review the arguments for 
using subsidies, and particularly hardware subsidies . 
Moral arguments 
Moral arguments are often used by advocacy groups 
and politicians to build the political case for sanitation 
subsidies . 
THe debaTe on saniTaTion subsidies
Part 2 :
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It can be argued that it is a government’s	moral	duty 
to care for its weaker citizens and to provide them 
with a minimum set of basic services that enable them 
to live healthy and productive lives (see for example 
the literature on the Right to Sanitation [COHRE et al ., 
2008]) . Linked to this is an often used argument that it 
is ‘not right’ to expect poor households to pay for their 
sanitation services while richer households, especially 
those connected to sewerage networks, can access the 
services at a much lower cost to them . 
It can also be argued that governments have a duty to 
promote equity, equal chances and access for all; or to 
support empowerment of certain disadvantaged groups 
or people . 
For many of these reasons the government of Thailand 
for example has been a leading advocate of sanitation 
subsidies, see	Box	1 .
The economic case 
These moral arguments for sanitation are translated by 
economists into a set of principles by which subsidies can 
theoretically be designed . 
Economists start from the premise that individuals 
and households tend to place a rather lower value on 
sanitation than society as a whole . Public intervention 
(sometimes a subsidy) may therefore be required to 
address the following constraints:
w	 Externalities – the fact that individual action or 
inaction has implications for society as a whole that 
are not mediated by the market; and
w	 Lack	of	information – the fact that households do 
not fully understand or appreciate the positive impact 
they may gain from improved sanitation, particularly on 
their health and the environment .
 
Economists use two terms to describe activities or 
products whose value to an individual is different from its 
value to society as a whole: public goods and merit goods . 
These can be contrasted with private goods whose 
benefits can be captured and protected by the individual 
who purchases them . 
Public	good
A public good is one that, if consumed by one 
person, can still be consumed by other people 5 .
The provision of universal sanitation has benefits which 
are enjoyed by society as a whole and from which 
no individual can be excluded . Universal sanitation is 
therefore a public good . Specifically, investments in 
shared elements (wastewater treatment facilities, 
sewerage and sludge collection services, hygiene 
promotion and sanitation marketing activities) have 
benefits which are shared or public, rather than private . 
(Conversely, poor coverage or poor functionality can 
produce a disproportionate dis-benefit – the opposite of a 
public good .) The public sector therefore has an interest 
in investing in the public or shared elements of sanitation . 
Merit	good
Merit goods are goods that society thinks everyone 
ought to have regardless of whether they are 
wanted by each individual 6 .
An investment in sanitation by an individual or household 
has benefits for society as a whole (by removing 
pathogens from the environment) . At the same time 
an individual household’s decision to invest in sanitation 
has little benefit for themselves if others do not similarly 
invest . This, combined with high costs means that many 
households tend to under-invest in sanitation . However 
we know that investments in sanitation have high levels of 
societal benefit . In other words at low levels of coverage 
sanitation is a merit good whose benefits exceed the 
value placed on it by individual households . The public 
sector therefore has an interest in changing individual 
choices to increase the level of investment in sanitation 
and move society towards universal sanitation . 
In most of the situations in which National WASH 
Coalitions are active, it is this merit good aspect of 
sanitation that is most important . Poor households have 
limited funds and tend not to prioritise investments in 
sanitation . Some policy makers argue that subsidies will 
offset these effects and ramp up the rate of investment 
in a sector with significant and important benefits for 
everyone . (Interestingly, Community-Led Total Sanitation 
counters this argument by using a non-hardware-subsidy 
approach while emphasising the character of sanitation 
as a merit good requiring community responsibility . See 
Box	4 .)
Box	1:	Thailand’s	rural	environmental	sanitation	
programme
For the past 50 years, Thailand’s rural environmental sanitation 
programme has been incorporated into the country’s five-year 
economic and social development plans . According to Luong 
et al . (2000) by 999, 92% of the rural population had access 
to improved drinking-water sources, while 98% of rural families 
had access to improved sanitation facilities . As latrine coverage 
has increased, mortality related to gastrointestinal diseases has 
decreased by more than 90% . 
A key component of the programme was the provision of supplies, 
equipment and transport; in particular the government supplied 
adequate latrine pans/slabs and moulds for latrine construction, 
as well as allocating revolving funds for latrine construction .
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THE ARGUMENTS AGAiNST 
SANiTATioN SUBSidiES
////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
There are essentially two arguments against the use of 
sanitation subsidies, both of which relate to what can 
go wrong when subsidies are poorly designed . The first 
argument is that subsidies can have a negative effect 
on the viability of the sector as a whole . The second is 
that subsidies can have unexpected consequences on 
household and community behaviours and outcomes . 
These are both arguments of caution and should be 
borne in mind as sanitation financing is designed .
Unintended consequences for the sector 
At the sector level the use of subsidies can both 
constrain and distort the provision of services .
Many	subsidised	latrines	are	unnecessarily	expensive .	
The traditional focus on subsidizing latrine construction 
in rural areas often turns out to be an expensive choice . 
For example ‘Government Latrines’ must be of a high 
standard with expensive materials, etc, thus pushing 
up costs, and sometimes producing latrines of better 
construction than houses . 
Subsidies	may	distort	other	sources	of	funding . In 
addition to raising costs, the delivery of infrastructure, 
operational and regulatory subsidies all have the effect of 
‘crowding out’ other sources of funding (from households) 
who prefer to wait for ‘free’ goods rather than accessing 
credit or paying for their own investments . This in turn 
stifles the financial market for credit services . 
Subsidies	may	stifle	innovation . This usually happens 
because subsidized latrine programmes are managed 
centrally and specify what type or types of latrines 
can be built . This prevents local innovation and can be 
particularly problematic in countries with widely varying 
geographical conditions . It also tends to distort the 
behaviour of private sector providers (who may focus for 
example on producing standard latrines called for by a 
government programme rather than on innovation) . 
As a consequence of the first two failings many	subsidy	
programs	are	simply	not	financially	sound	and	there	
is	not	enough	money	to	pay	for	them .	While many 
governments would like to provide free services to large 
numbers of people, this is rarely financially sustainable 
(Box	2) . Mehta and Knapp (2004) show that there is 
simply not enough public money to close the sanitation 
gap through infrastructure subsidies in most countries . 
Subsidy schemes that are not well financed eventually 
cease to function, resulting in low coverage or poor 
sustainability and lots of unserved people who are 
disincentivized/demotivated to pay for their services 
since their ‘neighbours’ were given a subsidy . At the same 
time a government’s drive to deliver a sanitation subsidy 
programme can become so great that it redirects	funds	
away from other high priority social sectors .
Unintended consequences at the household 
level
As well as distorting the national programme, the delivery 
of a subsidy sometimes fails to meet its objectives or 
has adverse effects at the household or community level . 
Unintended consequences may include: 
Poor	targeting resulting in the ‘wrong’ households 
benefiting from the subsidy . Subsidies may be captured 
by the more wealthy households or communities . Poor 
targeting means that fewer needy households benefit 
and results in the use of public funds to supplement 
the livelihoods of non-target households . An interesting 
analysis of this effect in the urban water supply sector in 
India can be read in Foster et al . (2002) and the same 
analysis applies in many cases to urban sanitation . Yepes 
(999) also showed that subsidies through the tariff 
failed to reach the poor in Guayaquil in Ecuador .
Poor	delivery may mean that the wrong types of 
services are subsidized (for example latrines that are 
too expensive) . A recent initiative of the European Union 
provided subsidies for small towns who needed to 
construct sanitation facilities to meet EU water quality 
regulations . However, in Hungary a lower-bound limit on 
the size of the systems that were eligible to receive funds 
had the unintended consequence of forcing very small 
rural communities to join together to build expensive 
widespread networks when small decentralized systems 
would have been cheaper 7 . This may compound problems 
of targeting (since the types of services on offer may not 
be relevant to needy households) and may also constrain 
the reach of a programme by using scarce public money 
to finance solutions which are unnecessarily expensive . 
Dependency	which occurs when subsidized services 
become the norm and communities or households cease 
to make independent investment decisions, preferring to 
wait for ‘subsidized’ public services (Jenkins and Sugden, 
2006) .
Box	2:	unsustainable	subsidies	in	Senegal	and	Ecuador
The recent six country study by WSP showed that the Programme 
d’Assainissement Autonome des Quartiers Periurbains de Dakar 
(PAQPUD) offered a wide range of appropriate sanitation solutions 
and benefited over 400,000 people over six years . Unfortunately 
it then had to stop when funding ran out, ‘wasting investments 
in demand promotion until the programme was extended with 
additional financing’ . The PRAGUAS programme in Ecuador in rural 
and small towns enabled 40,000 people to gain access to improved 
sanitation over the course of four and a half years, but the cost of the 
subsidy was high (USD 20 per sanitation facility) and accounted for 
60% of the total programme costs .
Trémolet et al . (forthcoming) .
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False	demand when households take a subsidized toilet 
or service because it’s available without truly wanting 
it . This is also likely to arise when hardware funding is 
not accompanied by sufficient investment in software . 
Goods and services purchased under these conditions 
may never be used or may be used for other activities 
once the programme ends – as	in	the	andhra	Pradesh	
project	described	in	Box	3 . They are also likely to be 
badly managed and may fall into disrepair quickly . 
unsustainable	latrines	are	built when subsidies are 
associated with one particular type of good (for example 
a type of latrine), thus skewing demand . This may result 
for example in households choosing pour-flush latrines 
over dry toilets even where water scarcity prohibits the 
proper operation of a pour-flush latrine . In South Africa 
the government’s subsidized latrine building programme 
has resulted in construction of many direct single pit 
latrines which now leaves municipalities with a huge 
backlog of latrines whose rapidly filling pits are almost 
impossible to empty safely (Eales and Potter, 2008) . 
ClARiTY oF oBJECTiVES
////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
One of the main problems with the design of sanitation 
financing appears to be that the disparate objectives 
of any public subsidy remain non-explicit . Thus different 
observers may attach different levels of priority to 
different objectives . For instance, the main objective 
of a subsidy scheme might be to ensure inclusion and 
empowerment of certain disadvantaged groups but 
it might equally be to protect the environment or to 
improve public health . It may also be political – to raise 
votes through hand-outs . Clearly in this situation the 
different observers are likely to have differing opinions 
about the success of the subsidy . 
The ‘political’ objective is particularly problematic . It is 
rarely made explicit, but can be a very important force 
when trying to alter or improve sanitation financing that is 
heavily reliant on government subsidies . It is also probably 
one of the major reasons why the topic of sanitation 
subsidies is so divisive . In fact, in many countries subsidy 
is a highly politicized issue and it is essential to be aware 
of implicit objectives of a subsidy scheme, in addition to 
the explicit ‘official’ objectives . 
SoME PRiNCiPlES FoR SMART 
SUBSidY dESiGN
////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
The above discussion highlights the need for care and 
caution in the overall design of the public financing of 
sanitation . The design needs to take into account not 
only current but also future considerations, and not 
only intended but also unintended consequences . The 
WSSCC/WHO (2005) Programming Guide publication 
lays out the following principles, which remain useful and 
valid, for the design of sanitation subsidies:
w	 Subsidies	should	achieve	the	intended	policy	
outcome: this requires not only smart subsidy design 
but	clarity	up	front	about	what	the	policy	objectives	
are . Choices and tradeoffs need to be made between 
different interest groups, the wealthy and the poor, 
rural and urban populations and short- and long-term 
objectives . 
 
w	 Subsidies	should	reach	the	intended	target	groups: 
this again requires clarity on who is the intended 
Box	3:	Examples	of	subsidies	that	have	‘gone	wrong’
Until 2008 the	Senegalese	government’s policy was to provide 
water service to all households through private connections 
and official, licensed vendors at standposts . The standposts are 
seen as a temporary method of supply, and the goal is eventually 
to provide each household with a private connection . For poor 
households the government provides a small diameter (5 mm) 
private connection at a subsidized rate – these are referred to 
as ‘social connections’ . However, Brocklehurst and Jansens 
(2004) observe that this policy suffers from a ‘major flaw’: the very 
criteria that make a household eligible for the subsidy more or less 
guarantees that it is not poor, because in order to obtain a social 
connection, an applicant must have title to the land, and an existing 
house must be located on it . A household that can afford this, and 
can afford to build a permanent house, is not among the poorest of 
the poor . This subsidy is thus not targeted at the poorest although 
it may achieve some increase in overall access . (Similar schemes 
for sanitation also exist and are also likely not to provide benefits to 
the poorest households) .
Poor targeting and the high hardware subsidies in the andhra	
Pradesh	TSC project in India and the	Lodhran	Pilot	Project	(LPP) 
in Pakistan have led to a shift in the balance of these programmes 
towards serving the non-poor, with few of the poor benefiting from 
the high hardware subsidies .
In the Andhra Pradesh Project the State Government used food-
for-work rice as payment for latrine construction . However, as 
rice stocks ran low an equivalent cash subsidy replaced the rice 
provision . Three million toilets have been built at a cost of INR 28 
crores (EUR 52 .3 million) but only half of these latrines are used 
(Heierli and Frias, 2007) . Many poor households knew little of the 
sanitation programme and built toilets for reasons other than safe 
excreta disposal . Robinson (2005) found that some built for the 
free rice, some built to gain a convenient washroom, and some 
built because the Gram Pachayat was paying . 
Robinson (2005) also observed that the benefits of the LPP 
sewerage schemes, which were 50% funded by local or external 
donors, have been accrued largely by better-off rural households . 
Those who already had toilets and septic tanks had connected 
easily to the new sewer network, and were more able to afford the 
expensive scheme contributions . In contrast, the poorest households 
were either excluded from the sewer network, or unable to utilize it 
until they had constructed a costly toilet and t-chamber .
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target group and how they can best be reached . It also 
requires that rigorous monitoring is in place to track 
how subsidies are reaching the intended groups .
w	 Subsidies	should	be	financially	sustainable: this 
requires a solid understanding of the potential scale of 
needs and the costs of the programme . Costs include 
both upfront capital costs and long-term operational 
and maintenance costs even in rural areas . It also 
requires a good understanding of how to get the best 
possible leverage (increase) in funding from other 
sources (typically households and market sources) . 
Only on this basis can a sustainable financial regime be 
put in place .
w	 Subsidies	should	be	implemented	in	a	clear	and	
transparent	manner: finally, since they involve the use 
of large sums of public money, subsidy programmes 
need to be clear and transparent, enabling eligible 
households or communities to access them and 
providing clear recourse mechanisms in cases 
where there is a suggestion of impropriety . Proper 
monitoring and evaluation is an essential element of 
such transparency and must be fully financed as part 
of the subsidy programme .
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TyPes of subsidies
The debate about subsidy schemes described in Part 2 is largely focused on experiences with infrastructure subsidies (often 
called hardware	subsidies) . However there are a wide range of subsidy mechanisms that can be used to deliver public 
financing to sanitation . This part of the primer describes the principle types of subsidy of relevance in the sanitation sector .
Part 3 :
FiNANCiNG FoR SoFTWARE
////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
Part  laid out some principles for sanitation financing 
that suggested that public financing for software 
activities can generally be justified . This would include (but 
not be limited to):
w	 Capacity building and training
w	 Development of promotional materials and campaigns 
(often known as Information, Education and 
Communication or IEC)
w	 Monitoring and evaluation systems and processes
w	 Financial management, budgeting and advocacy in the 
national planning process
w	 Recurrent budgets of health extension workers (or 
similar) responsible for hygiene behaviour change 
activities
w	 Market research and development of sanitation 
marketing activities
w	 Recurrent budgets for school sanitation and hygiene 
programmes
While this type of funding is often difficult to track 
it delivers benefits that are clearly public . It has the 
advantage that it can be delivered in ways which do 
not skew demand or influence the supply of sanitation 
goods and services in inappropriate ways and it does not 
suppress the willingness of households to invest their 
own resources in the sector (economist use the term 
‘crowding out’ to describe this effect) . 
It is vital that these costs are fully accounted for in 
the planning of a sanitation programme as they can 
be significantly large and recur over many years . A 
programme which cannot provide needed recurrent 
budgets for staff and for ongoing software activities is 
unlikely to be sustainable . 
Once the software elements of the programme are fully 
funded the outstanding question remains, to what extent 
and in what form should public money be channelled 
to hardware? The options for the delivery of hardware 
subsidies are described below . 
TYPES oF HARdWARE SUBSidiES
////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
Introduction
Ten types of mostly hardware subsidies are introduced in 
the sections below . These are summarized in Table	2 .
Direct subsidies 
Direct subsidies involve the payment (in the form of cash 
or vouchers) directly to the recipient household which is 
then able to ‘spend’ to access a range of services . 
Direct subsidies have been little used in single sector 
interventions because of the high costs of identifying 
the most needy households . However, if the poorest 
households can be accurately identified, direct subsidies 
are both efficient and effective . Chile has long used direct 
subsidies for a basket of social services and they are 
also popular in many European countries where they are 
sometimes delivered as tax credits or repayments from 
the tax system for households with particular needs . 
The Chilean system is widely regarded as efficient and 
relatively free of errors of exclusion (inadvertent exclusion 
of the needy) and errors of inclusion (inadvertent support 
to non-needy households) . For a longer description see 
Foster et al . (2000) . 
Infrastructure subsidies 
The use of public money to construct new infrastructure 
is one of the most familiar forms of subsidy . 
In	rural	areas and some urban contexts the most 
common form is payment of part or all of the cost of 
household toilets . This is generally described as a subsidy 
for the ‘private’ element of the system and is justified 
on the grounds that cost is the most significant barrier 
to certain households accessing services . Targeting 
may be done through means-testing, geographical 
targeting, or by subsidizing only certain levels of services 
(a basic single-pit latrine for example) . Trémolet et al . 
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(forthcoming) found that well-targeted infrastructure 
subsidies had made a positive contribution for reaching 
the hardcore poor in both Maharashtra in India and in the 
Dishari project in Bangladesh . 
Traditionally funds are handled by a public-sector provider 
who delivers the new facility to selected households . In 
some cases households need to make a contribution 
in cash or labour to access the subsidy . In	India for 
example, for many years households were eligible for 
construction of a Twin-pit Pour-flush latrine once they 
had dug the two pits required . The limited success of 
this approach led, in 999, to a redesign of the Indian 
sanitation programme, now entitled the Total Sanitation 
Campaign (TSC) . The approach now relies much less 
heavily on infrastructure subsidies, which are only 
provided to the poorest families once a community has 
achieved ‘open-defecation free’ status . This output-based 
approach appears to have resulted in better targeting . A 
recent study by WSP suggested that in Maharashtra less 
than 0% of the people who received the subsidy were 
not eligible and only 0 to 20% of eligible poor families 
did not receive the subsidy (Trémolet et al ., forthcoming) . 
In urban	areas public funds are typically mobilized 
to pay for shared elements of networks (sewers and 
treatment for example) and such subsidies are (perhaps 
erroneously) regarded as normal and proper, even when 
the benefit is primarily a private good for those fortunate 
enough to be able to connect . In general this type of 
subsidy benefits richer urban elites through the provision 
of ‘below-cost’ networked sewerage services . Household 
subsidies for onsite sanitation are also sometimes 
provided in urban areas . 
Theoretically in urban areas infrastructure subsidies 
could also be used to improve access to and quality 
of sanitation services through the provision of special 
facilities designed to improve services for the poorest 
and least well serviced . Examples of this might include 
the construction of transfer stations for proper disposal 
of pit wastes in poorer urban areas, or the provision 
of bulk connections to the sewerage network for poor 
communities willing to manage their own local service 
arrangements for themselves 8 . It can also include 
construction of public latrines in public places such as 
bus stations and markets and may also involve part 
financing of shared or community-managed latrines in 
informal or high-density areas . 
A general problem with infrastructure subsidies is that 
inadvertent targeting may occur because particularly 
advantaged groups (e .g . those with land tenure, or 
those who are literate and can apply for a subsidy) are 
disproportionately benefited .
Connection subsidies 
Many urban utilities charge households to connect to 
networked sewerage services . Households are often 
charged a ‘fee’ for the new connection, plus part or all of 
the capital costs of connecting the house to a sewer in 
the street and often must also pay a ‘deposit’ on some 
or all of the assets provided . Typically these connection 
costs can be very high and are often regarded by utilities 
as an important income stream . From the householders 
point of view however high one-off connection fees can 
form a very real barrier to connecting to the public 
services, see for example Kayaga and Franceys (2007), 
who found that in Uganda the mean cost of a new 
water connection was USD 500 (median of USD 97) 
– unaffordable for households earning USD 2 per day . 
The levying of such fees is inherently anti-poor since 
the poor are least able to pay . Evans et al . (2002) also 
point out that it is anti-poor because poor households 
account for a disproportionate number of unconnected 
households . In effect payment for connection represents 
a cross subsidy from the unconnected to the connected 
who are often benefiting from artificially low tariffs (see 
consumption subsidies below) . 
The barrier created by high costs of connections can 
be easily removed either by amortising the costs of new 
connections across all utility bills, by providing credit, in 
the form of staggered payments over months or by the 
provision of a direct subsidy to targeted households to 
cover the costs (a connection subsidy) . Output-based 
arrangements (see below) are particularly well suited 
for the delivery of connection subsidies . All of these have 
progressive outcomes and promote rational decision 
making by the utility .
Operational subsidies 
Operational subsidies involve the payment of money to 
a service provider to offset some or all of the costs of 
supplying a service . For example, in urban areas, a utility 
service provider may receive annual payments from 
central government to offset operational losses from its 
business or to pay for an artificial lowering of water or 
sanitation tariffs . This tends to be a blunt instrument with 
poor targeting, resulting in a disproportionate benefit to 
the rich . 
Operational subsidies for utility operations and software 
services are often ignored in policy debate . They are 
rarely fully transparent but often represent a very 
significant transfer of public funds to the sanitation 
sector . In addition, they can end up encouraging 
inappropriate capital investment in infrastructure with 
very high running costs, because the service provider has 
no incentive to strive for cost-effectiveness or efficiency 
of the service . If the utility charges very low tariffs the 
subsidy may be very large and as it recurs every year it 
places a heavy burden on the public budget . If sufficient 
public money is not available the utility will be forced to 
under-invest in maintenance, resulting in poor operation 
of the sanitation system, which in turn may pose risks to 
public health and the environment . 
Subsidies to small-scale operators 
A less common form of operational subsidy is provided 
to bring down the costs of operation of small-scale 
service providers (the types of small enterprises that 
build latrines or empty latrine pits for example) . These 
can be provided in the form of subsidized training and the 
provision of central business development services such 
as business planning, accountancy and auditing, although 
these may sometimes be included in the software for 
a sanitation programme . More pertinently here such 
subsidies may also be provided in the form of guarantees 
and subsidized loans to purchase start up equipment for 
small operators, which will have the effect of reducing 
the costs of services to the end user . Subsidies to small-
scale operators can be highly effective in some locations 
but it is important to have a good understanding of the 
market for their services and the availability of suitable 
entrepreneurs with capacity to absorb and make use of 
any subsidies on offer (see Box	4) .
Cross-subsidies 
A cross-subsidy occurs when one group of users 
contribute to part of the costs of providing services to 
another group . Cross-subsidies through the tariff in the 
water sector are relatively common and theoretically 
in some urban areas there is also a cross subsidy for 
sanitation – with high-volume water consumers paying 
more for sewerage services than those who consume 
less, even though each group benefits equally from the 
operation of the sewerage network and treatment plant . 
In practice the effect of this cross subsidy is usually 
rather limited since most of the poorest households are 
not connected to the domestic water supply network and 
fewer still benefit from networked sewerage . 
In urban networks another type of cross subsidy, between 
connected and non-connected households, is also 
possible through the collection of a sanitation ‘surcharge’ 
on the water bill or through the amortising of all the costs 
of new sanitation services within the structure of the 
water tariff (see Box	5) . 
In rural areas some programmes use cross subsidies 
designed and wholly generated within the community 
to support the poorest and least-able households to 
construct or purchase new latrines or other sanitation 
services . This type of cross subsidy uses households’ own 
money directly; the flow of funds is not through the public 
purse . In this sense, this type of subsidy differs from the 
others described in this section . An advantage of this type 
of subsidy is that it gives communities and households 
a large say in the financing arrangements they choose . 
Cross subsidies within the community do have some 
possible negative side effects, as they can interfere with 
the social relations between different groups and may put 
some households in ‘debt’ in some subtle way to others .
Box	4:	The	Improved	Latrines	Program	in	Mozambique
The Improved Latrines Program (Programa de Latrinas 
Melhoradas – PLM) was initiated in Mozambique in the early 
980s in very difficult circumstances, including civil war and 
extreme poverty . The programme aimed to provide low-cost 
sanitation solutions to households in peri-urban areas through 
a network of latrine and slab producers in all main cities . These 
producers are referred to as “PLM workshops” by the programme 
and they are neither purely public nor private . The approach to the 
programme has evolved substantially over the years . Over the last 
7 years, the programme has benefited almost 2 million people 
in peri-urban areas of all the major towns . The average hardware 
cost of the sanitation solution built under the programme (the 
improved latrine) was around USD 70 . 
The programme initially helped setting up these production 
workshops, through a combination of software support (training 
activities, etc .) and subsidies (in many cases, the land on which the 
workshops operate was provided for free by the government) . From 
992, the government started providing production subsidies to 
the workshops based on their sales (as such, the programme can 
be seen as an early form of providing output-based subsidies) . 
The subsidies were intended to cover between 40 and 60% of 
production costs (depending on the region, to reflect differences 
in input costs and poverty levels) and to reduce the sale price to 
households . From 994, the government (with external donor 
support) also financed the costs of ‘community animators’ to 
carry out social marketing and sanitation promotion campaigns 
(it is not possible to estimate the value of such software support, 
however, as this system has since been dismantled following 
decentralization) . 9 
Text drawn from Trémolet et al ., forthcoming .
Box	5:	Cross-subsidies	–	sanitation	surcharge	in	Burkina	Faso	
Burkina Faso has achieved more positive results than most 
countries in financing urban sanitation through its policy of adding 
a sanitation services levy on all water bills . The levy (or surcharge) 
was first introduced in 985 but utilization of these fees to 
support on-site sanitation didn’t start until the 990s; since then 
it has shown how leveraging is effective in facilitating household 
investment in the sector . Savina and Kolsky (2004) identify the 
following aspects of the surcharge as having contributed to the 
success in spurring sanitation investment: 
w	Use of the surcharge for certain aspects of sanitation only .   
 Money is used on sanitation promotion rather than on building  
 toilets .
w	The direct transfer of surcharge revenues to a dedicated   
 sanitation account, without the intervention of central government . 
w	The existence of clear indicators of the surcharge’s    
 ‘performance’ in stimulating demand .
w	The levy and use of the surcharge by an operationally and   
 financially viable organization . 
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Interestingly a recent study by WaterAid suggested that 
the process of assessing needs at the community level 
through a community-led wealth ranking exercise was 
at least as, if not more, important than the existence of 
an external subsidy in determining equitable outcomes 
in a sanitation programme in Nepal . This suggests that 
cross-subsidies may work well when the facilitation of the 
process is good (Jones et al ., forthcoming) . 
Consumption subsidies 
In many urban areas tariffs for sewerage services 
are kept artificially low . This represents a subsidy 
towards the cost of ‘consumption’ of the service, or 
a consumption subsidy . When prices are kept low in 
this way, the service provider will inevitably sustain 
losses . These losses must either be covered through 
operational subsidies to the supplier or they will result 
in systematic underinvestment in routine maintenance 
and rehabilitation of the network . In the cities and towns 
of the south, systematic underinvestment is common 
and typically includes failure of the utility to, for example, 
repair leakages or expand the network to new areas 0 . 
This, in turn, may lead to environmental degradation 
and the need for high rehabilitation costs or premature 
replacement . It also means that there is no money 
available to extend services to unserved areas, which are 
usually characterized by higher rates of poverty than the 
already-covered areas . This type of funding arrangement 
therefore represents a kind of reverse cross-subsidy 
between potential future users (who are thereby 
excluded) and existing users .
Output-based subsidies 
Output-based subsidies are delivered against services 
successfully delivered (effective sanitation) rather than 
inputs (excavation, pipes and toilets) . Thus an output-
based subsidy might be paid to a utility company when 
they have connected poor households to the sewerage 
network and demonstrated that a service is being 
provided for a pre-agreed period . Output-based subsidies 
can also be provided to operating companies running 
sewage treatment facilities or private pit-emptiers (for 
instance through voucher schemes) if they can increase 
the amount of faecal sludge delivered to the plant from 
poorer neighbourhoods using on-site sanitation . In rural 
areas similarly, an output-based subsidy might be paid 
to a local government or service provider if they can 
achieve 00% reduction in open defecation in certain 
communities . 
Some countries offer a community-wide award (or 
reward) to communities who achieve certain aims 
– typically the elimination of open defecation . This type 
of award is increasingly common in South Asia for 
example where it is offered in tandem with CLTS-type 
interventions . Typical of this approach is the Nirmal Gram 
Puraskar programme in India, which offers awards at the 
Panchayat (village) and District level . Independent verifiers 
assess progress and the awards are presented by the 
President of India . The money can be spent in the area on 
any development projects . 
The advantage of output-based subsidies is that they are 
only paid once services have successfully been delivered 
– thus removing one of the major drawbacks of more 
conventional infrastructure subsidies that may be paid to 
a service provider who fails to deliver a working service . 
In this way they represent an efficient way of spending 
public funds . However the cost of the services may rise 
due to the fact that the service provider must finance the 
investment upfront and only recoups the costs once the 
services are being delivered . Like other subsidies, output-
based subsidies rely on good quality verification and 
monitoring . However, unlike other forms, the verification 
process can be driven by the users themselves and 
their verification that services have been delivered . The 
costs of verification can be relatively high, although this 
is probably more a reflection on the lax monitoring of 
conventional non-output-based subsidies than a criticism 
of output-based subsidies themselves, where verification 
is required to trigger payments .
Regulatory advantages 
Inadvertent subsidies occur when policy is used to favour 
certain types of service delivery . For example in urban 
areas large-scale utility providers may benefit from 
regulations that grant them operating monopolies in 
certain areas, or from technical norms and standards 
that favour networked sewerage over more decentralized 
sanitation . These types of regulations tend to encourage 
the tolerance of inefficient monopoly utilities . They 
may also raise the operating costs of smaller service 
providers (by requiring them to meet unreasonable 
standards to participate in the market) and therefore 
constitute a subsidy to the larger-scale operators . This 
type of subsidy is usually hidden or unclear and may have 
little positive benefit for the majority of householders .
Subsidized credit 
A final mechanism for the delivery of public funding 
into the sector is through subsidies and guarantees 
to micro-finance institutions (MFIs) who can then lend 
money for sanitation investments to households at 
reduced interest rates . MFIs may also provide other 
important services, such as micro-savings and micro-
insurance which can also enable more households to 
make needed investments and manage their sanitation 
facilities over the long term . Channelling public money 
through MFIs has the dual advantage that it stimulates 
the development of micro finance services and leaves 
households in control of decisions about the type and 
cost of services to be paid for . It also has the advantage 
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Table 2: summary of Types of subsidy 
How IT works
urban rural
DIrEcT suBsIDIEs Payment direct to individuals or households. Payment may be in the form of cash, voucher or tax credit. 
Householder or individual spends the money either freely or on specified goods and services.
INfrasTrucTurE suBsIDIEs 
(PrIvaTE facIlITIEs)
Public sector provision of latrines or latrine parts, usually through direct implementation with some 
input (cash/labour) from households. 
INfrasTrucTurE suBsIDIEs 
(PuBlIc facIlITIEs)
Public sector provision of shared elements of the 
sanitation system.
coNNEcTIoN suBsIDIEs Cost of connecting is covered by a transfer from 
government to utility, through vouchers or by 
transfer from general utility revenue. 
oPEraTIoNal suBsIDIEs operational Expenditure (opex) subsidies to 
utilities and local government service providers.
suBsIDIEs To small scalE 
oPEraTors
Funding for training, business development services, product development etc. plus access to 
subsidized credit or subsidized goods and services resulting in lower costs to customers. Small-scale 
operators may build or service toilets and sanitation systems in rural and urban areas.
cross suBsIDIEs Transfers through the tariff from high- to low- 
consumers or from connected to unconnected 
households.
Transfers (in cash and labour) from richer to 
poorer households to construct latrines.
coNsumPTIoN suBsIDIEs Subsidies through reduced tariff or deferred 
maintenance.
Rarely relevant.
ouTPuT-BasED suBsIDIEs Subsidies paid only after delivery of a service (working latrines being used, open defecation-free 
communities, delivery and treatment of faecal sludge at a wastewater treatment plant).
rEgulaTory suBsIDIEs Preferential legal rights for selected (usually large 
or public) service providers. Technical norms and 
standards and licences allow only selected service 
providers to construct publicly-funded facilities.
Selected service providers.
suBsIDIzED crEDIT interest payments on micro-finance services are 
kept low by provision of bank guarantees or other 
support to micro finance providers if they lend for 
sanitation goods and services.
Households whose primary barrier to access is 
financial.
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wHo BENEfITs? aDvaNTagEs DIsaDvaNTagEs
Household/individual can access 
services. Where supply is not 
constrained specific suppliers may 
also increase market share.
Empowers the household/individual and 
stimulates the supply of goods and services 
without constraining the market.
Expensive and complex to administer – probably 
not viable except when bundled together with 
other social services when targeting becomes 
cost-effective. does not take into account longer 
term operation & Maintenance (o&M).
Household/individuals who receive 
the subsidized latrine. Theoretically 
community through demonstration 
effects.
if well targeted enables poorest households to 
access services.
Expensive, with limited reach. Tends to skew/fix 
technical designs at ‘high-cost’ end and stifles 
market/self provision and innovation. open to 
perverse incentives. does not take into account 
o&M.
Households connected to a working 
system. 
Ensures public benefits from urban sanitation. does little to benefit those who are unconnected. 
May divert resources from getting existing 
system to work. does not take into account o&M.
Unconnected households 
(particularly the poor) living in areas 
covered by sewers.
Very effective at reaching the poorest (who tend 
to be unconnected) and increases connectivity 
to the system, which improves operational 
efficiency. Ensures public benefits from urban 
systems.
if funds are provided through a transfer 
from general utility revenue then this may 
result in increased costs for other services, or 
underinvestment in operation and maintenance. 
only relevant where households can connect to 
operational network.
Connected households. Addresses long term o&M. May damage long-term sustainability of utility 
operations by building in inefficiencies and low-
tariff/poor service equilibrium.
Households who use small-scale 
operator services – including 
potential new customers who can 
then access services.
Enables extension of services to new households 
and reduction of costs for existing served 
households – particularly the poorest who often 
use the services of small-scale providers.
Has limited/slow effect in areas where private 
sector activity is limited. Some risk of failure 
of some small operators resulting in lost 
investment.
Varies with type of subsidy. in rural areas the community may be efficient at 
targeting and allocating resources. Can also be 
used for o&M/upgrading in urban areas.
in urban areas targeting may be poor and system 
may fail if utility finances are weak. in rural areas 
can be captured by elites.
Connected households only. Cheap to administer and can theoretically be 
targeted through increasing-block tariffs or other 
disaggregated consumption tariffs. Requires 
operational subsidies.
May damage financial status of utility further, 
maintenance backlog increases risk and reduces 
capacity to connect new households.
Target households – payment is only 
made if they receive a service so 
accountability is high.
Prevents wastage of public money paying for 
inputs that do not result in desirable outcomes. 
Encourages efficiency and accountability.
Complex to administer and investments must be 
pre-financed.
Selected service providers. Assured minimum standard of service for those 
connected.
Tends to stifle the private and informal sector, 
and constrains households willing to self-provide.
Households whose primary barrier to 
access is financial.
does not distort the market for goods and 
services and stimulates micro finance interest in 
sanitation. Households retain control.
Requires competent micro finance providers, 
can be complex to administer and requires good 
financial skills.
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of not interfering with the supply-side market for goods 
and services – in fact by stimulating demand it may 
also stimulate the development of a bigger market 
of small-scale providers of goods and services . MFIs 
may also be better than government at assessing 
whether households can afford the long-term costs of 
their investment . Box	6 describes a programme with 
subsidized credit in Vietnam .
Box	6:	The	Sanitation	Revolving	Fund	in	Vietnam
A Sanitation Revolving Fund (SRF) component was incorporated in 
the broader Three Cities Sanitation Project in Vietnam to provide 
loans to low-income households for building on-site sanitation 
facilities . Working capital for the revolving funds was provided 
by the World Bank, DANIDA (Denmark) and FINNIDA (Finland) 
for three sub-projects in Danang City, Haiphong City and Quang 
Ninh Province (Halong City and Campha Town) . The programme 
benefited almost 200,000 people over the course of seven years . 
The average hardware costs of the sanitation facilities built through 
the program was USD 97 .
The SRF provided small loans (USD 45) over two years at partially 
subsidized rates to low-income and poor households to build a 
septic tank or, in fewer cases, a urine diverting/composting latrine 
or a sewer connection . The subsidized interest rate was equivalent 
to providing a USD 6 subsidy on each loan . The loans covered 
approximately 65% of the average costs of a septic tank and 
enabled the households to spread these costs over two years . The 
loans acted as a catalyst for household investment but households 
needed to find other sources of finance to cover total investment 
costs, such as borrowing from friends and family . Additional funding 
was provided by the project for software activities .
Trémolet et al . (forthcoming) found that these subsidies were 
highly effective at mobilising households’ own investment; each 
dollar of public investment generated 20 dollars of investment 
from households . Targeting also appeared to be extremely good; 
all of the beneficiaries were found to be in the bottom income 
quintile . The programme was also highly sustainable – the funds 
have already been revolved several times and the scheme, which 
is now administered through Women’s Unions, could continue 
operating until demand is exhausted . 
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smarT financing of saniTaTion sysTems
In this section we turn from the discussion of sanitation programming overall to the examination of a typology of sanitation 
systems based on some generalised technological approaches . This is useful for focusing down onto practical guidance 
on the design of public finance for sanitation programmes in differing contexts . We discuss some financing options which 
apply the broad principles laid out in Part  of this primer to each of them . 
Part 4 :
SANiTATioN SYSTEMS
////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
In addition to adhering to the before mentioned principles 
for smart subsidy design, a key element in the design of 
smart sanitation financing arrangements is the type of 
sanitation system (or technology) that is being used . 
Sanitation systems take numerous forms . The recent 
publication ‘Compendium of Sanitation Systems and 
Technologies’ from EAWAG/WSSCC by Tilley (2008) 
defines eight categories of sanitation systems and for a 
detailed discussion of these the reader is recommended 
to read this publication . While many systems vary 
technically the core technical considerations which 
impact on the design of finance systems are:
w	 Type of user interface/collection system (on-site 
versus off-site)
w	 Type of treatment for wastes (re-use/nutrient 
recycling versus disposal)
w	 Location of treatment (household, neighbourhood, 
centralized)
For the purpose of this publication we will therefore 
consider four broad categories of sanitation systems:
w	 on-site	systems	with	nutrient	recycling	in	the	
home/neighbourhood: generally referred to as 
ecological sanitation systems . The simplest form of 
ecological sanitation system is an arborloo, but more 
complex urine-diverting systems are also used in some 
places . In rural areas the recycled waste products 
can often be used directly by the household as an 
agricultural input while in more densely-settled areas 
products may be given away or sold to neighbours or 
local farmers . 
w	 Rural	on-site	systems	with	no	nutrient	recycling	
(pit	latrines	which	may	require	emptying):	the most 
commonly-found group of latrines in rural areas, onsite 
systems vary from unimproved traditional latrines, 
through to improved forms such as the Ventilated 
Improved Pit (VIP) latrines and Twin Pit Pour-Flush 
Latrines (TPPL) . In single pit latrines, the pit must be 
emptied when it is full, which can be a hazardous job, 
or re-located, while in twin pit systems a full pit can be 
left for some time while the contents are processed 
before it requires emptying .
 
w	 urban	on-site	systems	with	no	nutrient	recycling	(pit	
latrines	and	septic	tanks	which	require	emptying): 
on-site latrines are also commonly constructed in 
urban areas where there is no sewerage network and 
are particularly common in peripheral urban growth 
areas . In urban areas where water is available, the 
pit is often replaced with a cesspit (a sealed pit) or 
occasionally a septic tank designed to provide partial 
treatment for the sludge . Twin pits are uncommon 
in densely settled areas, so single pits, cesspits and 
septic tanks are all required to be emptied and the 
hazardous septic sludge disposed of .
w	 off-site	systems	(latrines	connected	to	sewerage	
networks)	with	decentralized	or	centralized	
treatment/disposal: in a very small percentage of 
urban areas in developing countries, household toilets 
are connected to a sewerage network which is usually 
operated by a utility company or local government 
department . Households pay a connection charge and 
a surcharge (sometimes known as a ‘cess’) which is 
a partial levy on the water bill and supposed to cover 
the costs of operation of the sewerage network . 
Sometimes sewerage is connected to wastewater 
treatment facilities, but more commonly it discharges 
directly to the environment . 
liFE CoSTS oF SANiTATioN SYSTEMS
//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
In Part  we laid out the cost elements of a sanitation 
programme . Table	3 shows a preliminary assessment 
of whether each of these cost elements is likely to be 
comparatively high or low for our four types of sanitation 
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systems . This is based on what should be spent in order 
to maintain the sanitation facility in operation, rather 
than what is actually spent in practice: in many cases, 
operating expenses are kept artificially low and the 
facilities fall into disrepair only a few years down the line .
The remaining sections of this part of the primer 
consider the options for public financing of capital 
and operational costs of household and community 
infrastructure and services in our four types of sanitation 
systems .
Table 3: Indicative relative costs of Different sanitation systems
sofTwarE
Hygiene behaviour change, 
sanitation marketing and 
enabling environment 
(ongoing)
HarDwarE *
Household toilets
(Capital 
Expenditure)
Sludge 
management 
facilities (Capital 
Expenditure)
Sludge 
management 
operations 
(operational 
Expenditure)
oN-sITE 
sysTEms wITH 
NuTrIENT 
rEcyclINg
medium-very High in most 
locations where re-use is not a 
cultural norm. Particularly high if 
urine-diversion is proposed.
very low (arborloo) 
-High (urine 
diverting/composting 
latrines): specialised 
slabs and raised 
superstructure may 
be required.
very low (arborloo)
-High (special 
composting facilities 
and urine storage may 
be required).
low-medium: 
depending on 
location of re-use of 
products. Costs may 
be offset by income.
oTHEr rural 
oN-sITE 
sysTEms
low-medium: Costs may be 
slightly lower than for systems 
with recycling but recent 
research suggests that high and 
sustained investment in ignition 
and support processes leads to 
greater sustainability.
low-medium: varies 
with design of latrine, 
water availability etc.
low-medium: 
increased costs where 
twin pits and larger 
pits are constructed.
low-medium: costs 
may be prohibitive 
if wrong technology 
choices are made. 
opex costs may fall 
more heavily on least-
able households.
urBaN oN-sITE 
sysTEms
low-medium: As for rural, 
better ignition and sustained 
support may result in greater 
sustainability. Some investment 
in enforcement may also be 
required.
medium-very High: 
varies with design 
of latrine, water 
availability and land 
prices.
medium-High: 
suitable treatment 
and disposal 
options essential 
for an appropriate 
environmental 
and public-health 
outcome. Cost savings 
possible with low 
cost decentralized 
treatment. 
medium-High: varies 
with distance to 
treatment/disposal 
sites and technologies 
chosen. Costs of 
centralized tertiary 
treatment, if included, 
very high.
urBaN off-
sITE sysTEms
low: Costs may be relatively low 
and compliance not an issue if 
adequate services are provided. 
low (shallow sewers)-
High (conventional 
sewers): in dense 
urban areas sewerage 
may be cheaper 
than on-site systems. 
Costs much higher 
for conventional 
sewerage than for 
shallow sewers. 
medium-very 
High: cost savings 
possible with non-
conventional designs 
(shallow sewers) and 
low cost decentralized 
treatment.
medium-very High: 
costs are higher 
when conventional 
rather than shallow 
sewerage networks 
are used. Energy costs 
very high if pumping 
required; costs of 
centralized tertiary 
treatment, if included, 
very high.
* For simplicity we focus here on the hardware costs (capital/CAPEX and operational/oPEX) associated with the provision of services to households, including 
toilets and the management of faecal waste (sludge) or sewage. Public and institutional toilets are not included.
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FiNANCiNG oPTioNS FoR EACH 
SANiTATioN SYSTEM
//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
The main issues affecting the choice of financing 
mechanism for each of the four technical solutions are 
described below . For each technical solution a table 
(Tables	4-7 respectively) describes the various financing 
mechanisms available, ranging from self-financing to full 
subsidy; and the sources of the finances, ranging from 
purely private funds (user finance) to financing purely with 
public funds . The tables also show the main advantages 
and disadvantages or risks of each of the financing 
mechanisms in as much as can be inferred from the 
existing practice  . Examples of each of these financing 
mechanisms are provided in the right hand column .
Issues for consideration in financing on-site 
systems with local recycling 
(Refer to Table 4) 
On-site systems designed for re-use of treated wastes 
have the advantage of generating a product which has 
economic value, either because it can be used directly 
as an agricultural input on a farm or kitchen garden or 
because it can be sold . The product(s) may comprise 
either separated urine and composted faeces or a 
mixture of both . For this reason it may be possible for 
households to recoup the cost of construction of the 
facility through a subsequent income stream although 
this is not always guaranteed if there is no market for the 
product and it cannot be used directly by the household . 
However the capital costs may be high, particularly where 
urine separation is included in the design . In this case, 
households may require access to financial services 
(savings or credit) or a subsidy to enable them to make 
the initial investment . 
Furthermore the use of human waste as an agricultural 
input and the use of urine-separating latrine pans in 
particular are not the cultural norm in many countries . 
Additional software (promotion and marketing) inputs 
may be required to support the adoption and use of 
this type of facility and even then resale may not be 
possible . Such support may also be needed for a much 
longer period after construction to support the proper 
processing and safe use of the products . An additional 
cost may arise in the need for effective monitoring, and 
compliance mechanisms to ensure that human waste is 
used safely in agriculture .
A recent study commissioned by WSP showed the 
relatively high costs of on-site systems with recycling in 
urban areas of Africa and indicated that in the small set 
of cases examined, hardware subsidies were required 
to make the systems economically viable for households 
(Schuen and Parkinson, forthcoming) . 
Issues for consideration in financing rural on-
site systems 
(Refer to Table 5)
In more traditional on-site systems the capital costs 
are often much lower . Many traditional sanitation 
programmes have focused on providing subsidized on-
site latrines, with some of the effects already mentioned 
above . Subsidies are often justified as a way to stimulate 
demand – with a limited number of ‘targeted’ subsidies 
available to encourage early adopters to build latrines . 
Another popular approach is to provide a revolving 
fund which theoretically allows poorer households to 
‘borrow’ funds to construct a latrine and pay the funds 
back over time – thereby enabling another household 
to benefit later . The major problems with these types 
of mechanisms seem to relate to targeting – it is often 
not the poorest and most disadvantaged that are able 
to make use of them . A second problem relates to the 
fact that they may skew technology choices, encouraging 
families to build more expensive latrines, or for example a 
pour-flush latrine with a concrete slab, even where water 
is scarce . This effect can be minimized if only particular 
essential elements are subsidized (the slab for example) . 
Finally, many revolving funds seem to fail when early-
adopters fail to pay back the money borrowed .
Box	7:	Evidence	of	success	of	CLTS-type	interventions
Proponents claim that the main advantage of the total sanitation 
approach over conventional policies is that it is a community-wide 
approach, which requires that every household in the community 
stops open defecation and uses a sanitary toilet . This approach 
involves even the poorest and most vulnerable households in 
the community, and ensures that the community and local 
government focus on helping these households gain access to a 
sanitary toilet with a safe excreta disposal system . The success of 
CLTS interventions worldwide is illustrated by the following: 
w	 In Bangladesh, latest figures show that CLTS has spread to  
 over ,500 villages, a population of almost 2 million (Deak,  
 2008) . Over 400 villages have reached ODF status . 
w	 As part of a study in South Asia, Robinson (2005) found access  
 to sanitation was high in all of the programmes using a ‘total  
 sanitation approach’ and that toilet usage was measured  
 as being over 70% in four of the seven projects studied . 
w	 In Indonesia, Mukherjee (2008) reports that by using the CLTS 
 approach 262 villages have become ODF in just eight months  
 in one state alone .
w	 Harvey (2008) describes how by using a CLTS approach in an  
 area of Zambia, 90,000 people in 57 villages have gained  
 access to a toilet in just one year, with the coverage increasing  
 from 0% to 00% in some villages in just one month!
WaterAid (forthcoming) find that CLTS-type interventions in 
Bangladesh, Nepal and Nigeria are highly cost-effective despite 
the challenges noted in achieving sustained removal of open 
defecation .
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Table 4: financing options for on-site systems with Nutrient recycling in the Home/Neighbourhood
fINaNcINg mEcHaNIsm aDvaNTagEs rIsks ExamPlEs
fINaNcINg sourcE: PurEly PrIvaTE (usErs of sErvIcE)
self financing: households invest 
in their own facilities and sell or use 
the recycled products.
w	 Reflects demand
w Maximum leveraging of 
household resources
w Maximum leveraging of 
market-based sources (if 
available) 
w	 Risk of poor quality 
construction – particular health 
risks associated with handling 
poorly treated products
w	 Suppliers/trained technicians 
may not be available
w	 Unaffordable for poor and 
middle income groups
Mexico and 
China each 
have examples 
of indigenous 
systems that are 
fully self-financed.
fINaNcINg sourcE: comBINaTIoN of PrIvaTE aND PuBlIc fuNDs 
support for software with low/no 
subsidy for hardware. Support 
can be delivered in form of:
w	 Hygiene promotion
w	 Sanitation marketing
w	 Subsidy can be linked to 
outcome (achieving open 
defecation-free status)
w	 Focuses public funds on public 
benefits (generating demand)
w	 May result in some community-
cross-subsidy
w	 The very poor may not be able 
to invest in certain types of 
infrastructure
w	 May result in inappropriate 
toilets in households with no 
outlet for the recycled product
micro-finance to households for 
sanitation or home improvements.
w	 Can be used to finance high 
upfront costs which can be 
recouped later
w	 demand may be low and 
require stimulation
loans to small-scale providers w	 lift constraint for SSiPs to enter 
the market
w	 Services may not reach the very 
poor
w	 demand may be very low
w	 Providers unwilling to ‘sell’ 
unfamiliar technology
Non-financial support to 
small-scale providers: training, 
product development, business 
development services.
w	 Boost private sector (supply 
side options) and can help to 
introduce new technology
w	 Service may not reach the very 
poor
w	 demand may still be low
output-based aid: grants to 
households or communities or 
to SSiPs based on successful 
construction and use of facilities.
w	 Subsidy linked to outputs 
– high levels of accountability
w	 Focuses attention on proper 
re-use of the products
w	 Requires pre-financing which 
may not be available
w	 Market financiers may be 
unwilling to pre-finance 
unfamiliar technology
community cross-subsidies: 
users contribute to the most needy 
households in cash or kind.
w	 Removes affordability 
constraint for the poorest
w	 May result in unsustainable 
service for poor and less-able 
households
Partial infrastructure subsidy: 
users contribute in cash or kind.
w	 Enhances ownership of the 
facility
w	 improved affordability 
(removes access constraint)
w	 May result in unaffordable 
sanitation for the very poor
w	 May result in inappropriate 
toilets in households with no 
outlet for the recycled product
fINaNcINg sourcE: PurEly PuBlIc fuNDs 
full hardware subsidy w	 Removes affordability 
constraint
w	 Allows households to 
‘experiment’ with new 
technology and test the market
w	 Can ignore or ‘crowd out’ 
households’ own investment
w	 Unequitable use of public 
funds if households have 
income stream from products
w	 Facilities may not be used if 
they do not meet demand
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Table 5: financing options for rural on-site systems with No Nutrient recycling (pit latrines that may require emptying)
fINaNcINg mEcHaNIsm aDvaNTagEs rIsks ExamPlEs
fINaNcINg sourcE: PurEly PrIvaTE (usErs of sErvIcE)
self financing: households invest 
in their own facilities. 
w	 Majority of latrines are 
currently financed in this way
w	 Reflects demand
w	 Maximum leveraging of 
household resources
w	 Maximum leveraging of 
market-based sources (if 
available)
w	 Poor quality construction 
w	 does not fully consider 
environmental impacts
w	 Suppliers may not be available/
poor quality
w	 Unaffordable for the very poor
Numerous, 
including india, 
lesotho, Vietnam, 
Bangladesh, 
Pakistan, Burkina 
Faso, Benin
fINaNcINg sourcE: comBINaTIoN of PrIvaTE aND PuBlIc fuNDs 
support for software with low/no 
subsidy for hardware. Support 
can be delivered in form of:
w	 Hygiene promotion
w	 Sanitation marketing
w	 Subsidy can be linked to 
outcome (achieving open 
defecation-free status)
w	 Focuses public funds on public 
benefits (generating demand)
w	 Based at community level; can 
build community cohesiveness
w	 May result in unaffordable 
sanitation for the very poor
w	 Sustainability is a risk once 
initial attention and support is 
withdrawn
ClTS in 
Bangladesh, total 
sanitation in 
india, many other 
programmes of 
WaterAid, Plan, 
UNiCEF etc.
micro-finance to households for 
sanitation or home improvements.
w	 Can be used to finance upfront 
costs 
w	 demand may be low and 
require stimulation
Honduras
loans to small-scale providers w	 lift constraint for SSiPs to enter 
the market
w	 Services may not reach the very 
poor
w	 demand may be very low
Grameen Bank
Non-financial support to 
small-scale providers: training, 
product development, business 
development services.
w	 Boost private sector (supply 
side options)
w	 Service may not reach the very 
poor
w	 demand may still be low
Bangladesh, 
Burkina Faso, 
Ghana, Peru, 
Senegal
output-based aid: grants to 
households or communities or 
to SSiPs based on successful 
construction and use of facilities.
w	 Subsidy linked to outputs 
– high levels of accountability
w	 Requires pre-financing which 
may not be available
community cross-subsidies: 
users contribute to the most needy 
households in cash or kind.
w	 Removes affordability 
constraint for the poorest
w	 May result in unsustainable 
service for poor and less-able 
households
Numerous 
including many 
ClTS projects and 
programmes
Partial infrastructure subsidy: 
users contribute in cash or kind.
w	 Enhances ownership of the 
facility
w	 improved affordability 
(removes access constraint)
w	 May result in unaffordable 
sanitation for the very poor
fINaNcINg sourcE: PurEly PuBlIc fuNDs 
full hardware subsidy w	 Removes affordability 
constraint
w	 Can ignore or ‘crowd out’ 
households own investment
w	 Facilities may not be used if 
they do not meet demand
w	 Results in unsustainable 
technology choices
Masibambane, 
South Africa
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Community-managed social funds are another option 
– leaving the community to determine which households 
should benefit and to what extent . Informal cross-
subsidies are also sometimes used – whereby more 
able households support the less able, usually with the 
provision of labour or materials rather than cash . 
Recently there has been renewed interest in explicitly 
‘subsidy-free’ approaches triggered by the success of 
the so-called Community-Led Total Sanitation (CLTS) 
approach, pioneered in Bangladesh . Earlier programmes 
which reduced or eliminated subsidies, such as the low 
cost sanitation programme in Lesotho in the 980s 
had marked success but subsequently hardware 
subsidies have become more popular . CLTS focuses the 
entire community’s interest on the elimination of open 
defecation . Innovation is encouraged to enable even the 
poorest and least-able families to construct or access a 
basic latrine and use it . CLTS-type interventions shy away 
from subsidies (although most CLTS programmes do 
maintain some targeted subsidy elements or rewards) 
and focus on fostering and embedding a complete 
change in behaviour . The cost of software activities may 
thus be relatively high but hardware subsidies are
reduced or eliminated . While it is early days, the 
success rates of these types of approaches appear 
to be initially higher than more conventional subsidy-
driven rural programmes (see Box	7) . Questions remain 
however over the long-term sustainability and financing 
requirements of these programmes and further 
research and evaluation is ongoing . To address long-term 
impact, many programmes have added an output-based 
subsidy component, where communities get rewarded for 
achieving (or maintaining) ODF status .
A significant challenge for on-site systems arises several 
months or years after the initial programme when 
pits need to be emptied or latrines moved . The use of 
subsidies to ‘speed up’ latrine adoption may result in 
too little attention being paid to long-term management 
plans . In some cases this results in latrines falling out 
of use once they are full or being damaged or broken 
in the process of being emptied . Even with CLTS-type 
interventions, preliminary evidence suggests that follow 
up support is still needed to help communities manage 
and evolve their sanitation systems over time .
Issues for consideration in financing urban 
on-site systems 
(Refer to Table 6)
On-site latrines in urban areas attract many of the same 
subsidies as they do in rural areas . The critical additional 
factor in urban areas is the need for sustained long-term 
sludge management . Urban latrines may have smaller 
pits and may also fill quicker than their rural equivalents 
due to high rates of usage, high water tables, misuse 
and disposal of solid waste in latrines, etc . They also 
often need to be managed and emptied more regularly 
because of the risk of contamination of local shallow 
water supplies . In congested areas however, sludge 
management may be very challenging . 
For this reason the use of subsidies to encourage 
construction of urban on-site systems must be 
undertaken with care, and embedded in a strategy for 
longer-term management of faecal sludge (Box	8) . 
Subsidies for sludge management could be directed at 
households (in the form of vouchers to pay for sludge 
emptying services) or at suppliers (who can then 
offer cheaper services to households) . To encourage 
proper disposal of sludge in appropriate locations, local 
authorities may also consider paying sludge emptiers on 
a volumetric basis for sludge delivered to appropriate 
transfer stations and disposal points . 
Local authority investments in collection and treatment 
services is also an important element of such a system 
and since its benefits are entirely public can justifiably be 
funded at least in part from public funds – at the least the 
public sector has a duty to ensure that this is done . Public 
funds may also be used to enforce certain minimum 
Box	8:	Single	pit	latrines	in	urban	South	africa
South Africa’s commitment to improving sanitation over the past 
decade has been an inspiration and a stimulus to many country 
programmes . The impacts of a strong rights-based policy 
approach, high-level political support and substantial funding 
are evident in the provision of fully-funded toilets to over three 
million households since the mid-990s, and an improvement in 
sanitation coverage from 48% to 7% . 
However, South Africa’s programme has become increasingly 
infrastructure-focused and as pressure has mounted to meet 
output-driven targets, the approach has become increasingly 
rigid and inflexible . A growing number of VIP toilet pits are filling 
up and becoming unusable, and there is increasing concern that 
the benefits of this substantial investment will be lost unless 
there is a massive correction soon .
Following the national sanitation policy drafted in 994, 
responsibility for water supply and sanitation has been 
decentralized to local government . For water, this has meant that 
the planning, management, operation and maintenance functions 
of water committees has been taken over by municipalities; but 
for on-site sanitation, the implications are less clear . Critically, 
government has not clarified the roles and responsibilities 
of users and municipalities around VIP maintenance . Most 
municipalities do not know how to respond to full pits, and 
users don’t see this as their responsibility; many users are now 
reverting to unimproved toilets or open defecation, with little net 
gain in health and hygiene behaviour . What is clear, though, is that 
the VIP toilets being built are grossly inappropriate for municipal 
servicing: many pits are small and sealed, the top-structures are 
not movable, and few facilitate access for pit desludging . 
Source: Eales and Potter (2008) .
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Table 6: financing options for urban on-site systems with No Nutrient recycling (pit latrines that may require emptying)
fINaNcINg mEcHaNIsm aDvaNTagEs rIsks ExamPlEs
fINaNcINg sourcE: PurEly PrIvaTE (usErs of sErvIcE)
self financing: households invest 
in their own facilities. 
w	 Reflects demand
w	 Maximum leveraging of 
household resources
w	 Maximum leveraging of 
market-based sources (if 
available)
w	 Poor quality construction 
w	 No attention to long-term 
faecal sludge management
w	 Suppliers may not be available/
poor quality
w	 Unaffordable for the very poor
Numerous
fINaNcINg sourcE: comBINaTIoN of PrIvaTE aND PuBlIc fuNDs 
support for software with low/no 
subsidy for hardware. Support 
can be delivered in form of:
w	 Hygiene promotion
w	 Sanitation marketing
w	 Subsidy can be linked to 
outcome (achieving open 
defecation-free status)
w	 Focuses public funds on public 
benefits (generating demand)
w	 May result in unaffordable 
sanitation for the very poor
w	 Sustainability is a risk 
unless city is making linked 
investments in sludge 
management
orangi Pilot 
project in Karachi 
and many others 
in Pakistan. Social 
intermediation 
Project in dhaka
micro-finance to households for 
sanitation or home improvements.
w	 Can be used to finance upfront 
costs 
w	 demand may be low and 
require stimulation
w	 Households may not have 
access to sludge management 
services
Parivartan project, 
Gujarat india
loans to small-scale providers w	 lift constraint for SSiPs to enter 
the market
w	 Can be targeted at sludge 
management operations 
to encourage long-term 
sustainability
w	 Services may not reach the very 
poor
w	 demand may be very low
orangi Pilot 
project with 
loans to family 
businesses 
Non-financial support to 
small-scale providers: training, 
product development, business 
development services.
w	 Boost private sector (supply 
side options)
w	 Can be targeted at sludge 
management operations 
to encourage long-term 
sustainability
w	 Service may not reach the very 
poor
w	 demand may still be low
cross-subsidies: sanitation 
surcharge from the water bill.
w	 Use of a sustainable cross-
subsidy
w	 Targets the least-served 
communities
w	 Funds availability is constrained 
by political willingness to raise 
the water bill
Burkina Faso 
subsidy for 
hardware (25%) 
and training for 
masons
output-based aid: grants to SSiPs 
based on successful construction 
and use of facilities.
w	 Subsidy linked to outputs 
– high levels of accountability
w	 Requires pre-financing which 
may not be available
SSiPs for onsite 
sanitation in dakar 
Senegal
Partial infrastructure subsidy: 
users contribute in cash or kind.
w	 Enhances ownership of the 
facility
w	 improved affordability 
(removes access constraint)
w	 May result in unaffordable 
sanitation for the very poor
w	 No access to sludge 
management services resulting 
in unsustainable system
fINaNcINg sourcE: PurEly PuBlIc fuNDs 
full hardware subsidy w	 Removes affordability 
constraint
w	 Can ignore or ‘crowd out’ 
households own investment
w	 Facilities may not be used if 
they do not meet demand
w	 Results in unsustainable 
technology choices
Masibambane, 
South Africa
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Table 7: financing options for off-site systems (latrines connected to sewerage networks) with decentralized or 
centralized treatment/disposal
fINaNcINg mEcHaNIsm aDvaNTagEs rIsks ExamPlEs
fINaNcINg sourcE: PurEly PrIvaTE (usErs of sErvIcE)
self financing: households invest 
in their own facilities. 
w	 Reflects demand
w	 Maximum leveraging of 
household resources
w	 Maximum leveraging of 
market-based sources (if 
available)
w	 Poor quality construction and 
bad system planning
w	 Unaffordable for the very poor
w	 only an option if networked 
sewers are available close to 
the household
Numerous 
including orangi 
Pilot Project, 
Pakistan, Malang, 
indonesia
fINaNcINg sourcE: comBINaTIoN of PrIvaTE aND PuBlIc fuNDs 
support for software with low/no 
subsidy for hardware. Support 
can be delivered in form of:
w	 Hygiene promotion
w	 Sanitation marketing
w	 Subsidy can be linked to 
outcome (achieving open 
defecation-free status)
w	 Focuses public funds on public 
benefits (generating demand)
w	 Will have limited or no impact 
unless working sanitation 
system is available
Public promotion 
campaigns in 
many utility 
companies
micro-finance to households for 
sanitation or home improvements.
w	 Can be used to finance upfront 
costs 
w	 demand may be low and 
require stimulation
w	 Households may not have 
access to sludge management 
services
w	 Will have limited or no impact 
unless working sanitation 
system is available
Parivartan 
programme in 
Ahmedabad, india
loans to small-scale providers w	 Can encourage service 
expansion into unserved areas
w	 Services may not reach the very 
poor
w	 Most utility companies do not 
encourage working with third-
party providers
w	 lack of regulatory capacity 
means management is 
challenging
Non-financial support to 
small-scale providers: training, 
product development, business 
development services.
w	 Boost private sector (supply 
side options)
w	 Encourages service expansion 
with little burden on public 
finances
w	 Service may not reach the very 
poor
Malang, indonesia
cross-subsidies: connection 
charges paid for from general 
revenue of the utility company.
w	 Use of a sustainable cross-
subsidy
w	 Targets the least-served 
households
w	 Funds availability is constrained 
by political willingness to raise 
the water bill
w	 Utilities may be unwilling to 
‘give up’ source of income
Burkina Faso, 
Senegal
output-based aid: grants 
to utilities or SSiPs based on 
successful construction and 
operation of local networks.
w	 Subsidy linked to outputs 
– high levels of accountability
w	 Requires pre-financing which 
may not be available
limited 
experience 
to date but 
proposals exist for 
Gharbeya, Egypt 
and Colombo, Sri 
lanka
fINaNcINg sourcE: PurEly PuBlIc fuNDs 
full hardware subsidy w	 Removes affordability 
constraint
w	 Rarely sustainable in the 
long run and results in severe 
underinvestment in the system
Many in 
industrialized and 
developing cities
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construction standards if this is appropriate, and to 
penalize improper disposal of faecal sludge . 
Several options exist for financing the public-elements 
of this type of urban system . Funds can be generated in 
the form of a cess on the water bill for households with a 
sewerage connection, or can be raised from local taxes . 
Issues for consideration in financing off-site 
systems 
(Refer to Table 7)
Off-site systems, usually comprising a house connection 
to a conventional or small-bore sewer network, are 
usually seen as a public good and financed from general 
revenue, or in a few cases by debt raised and serviced 
from the income of the operating utility company . The 
cost of connecting to the network, along with the cost of 
in-house plumbing, is generally expected to be financed by 
the land developer or property owner . 
There are two major problems with this model: 
Firstly the high cost of a connection often means that 
poor and unserved households are unable to access the 
publicly financed networked service . Options to subsidize 
or spread this cost exist . The simplest mechanism is to 
amortise the cost through several monthly payments 
attached to the water bill or across the entire finances 
of the utility company . Both of these options remove a 
key access barrier . The latter has the advantage of being 
quite progressive – enabling already-served households 
to cross-subsidize newer and unserved households which 
are likely to be poorer . 
The second problem is that in general coverage of 
networked sanitation is very low - very few people 
therefore benefit from the public subsidy which 
constructs and operates the public system . Furthermore 
the high levels of expenditure may prevent other public 
investments which would have a wider benefit (such as 
in extending the network and providing proper transfer 
stations close to areas using on-site systems) . 
Small bore sewers (often but not always condominial 
sewers) are cheaper to construct and operate and may 
remove some of the financial constraints – enabling a 
much greater expansion of networked services (Box	9) . 
Condominials can also be provided in decentralized 
networks with lower operational costs . However such 
community systems are often expected to be financed 
by the community alone – which once again gives rise to 
equity concerns if the conventional networked is highly 
subsidized . 
Box	9:	Costs	and	benefits	of	condominial	sewers	in	El	alto	
Bolivia
The El Alto Pilot Project in Bolivia was started in 998 and provided 
sewerage connections to 4,050 households in nine neighbourhoods 
of El Alto . The project combined a number of innovative components 
designed to reduce the costs and maximize the benefits of water 
and sewerage connections to poor households .
The innovations adopted in the project made it possible to reduce 
the costs of sewerage connections by 40% . About half of these 
savings were attributable to a condominial design (savings in the 
length and diameter of pipes and 75% savings in the volume of soil 
excavation as a result of shallower trenches), and the other half 
to the use of community volunteer labour to build the networks . 
A higher percentage of households were connected to newly 
installed sewerage networks at project sites (75%) compared 
with a control neighbourhood (66%) using conventional sewerage . 
Households receiving hygiene education were twice as likely to 
install a bathroom in their homes as those that did not; a proportion 
of 70% as opposed to 35% . Moreover, they increased their water 
consumption by 30% for hygiene related activities . In broader 
terms, the experience demonstrates that with a combination of 
technological innovation and human capacity building it is possible 
to make piped sewerage services both more affordable and more 
beneficial to poor households .
Source: Foster (200) . 
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PrinciPles for imProving 
THe design of subsidies
Part 5:
WHAT HAS BEEN lEARNEd12
////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
Reviewing the impact of current approaches, the 
overriding impression is not that public subsidies fail 
per se but that they fail when they are associated with 
supply-driven approaches which fail to take account of 
household preferences and behaviour or where they 
focus too much on hardware and there is insufficient 
funding available for the essential ‘software’ elements of 
the sanitation programme . The design of smart subsidies 
is a challenging task and it requires close attention to the 
specifics of every case . 
GoiNG To SCAlE: SUBSidiES AS A 
lEVERAGiNG Tool
////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
In the past, reliance on household hardware subsidies 
and subsidized sewerage has tended to ‘crowd out’ 
two important additional sources of finance – the 
household itself, and the market . This outlook is now 
beginning to change and there is increasing recognition 
of the possibility of greater household and community 
resources being mobilized through full or partial cost 
sharing and technical innovation as part of a well 
designed overall financial strategy . 
In other words, public subsidies could be used to 
leverage much greater investment if they are used 
explicitly in support of other sources of funds for more 
appropriate goods and services . This approach, widely 
recognized in the literature on both sanitation marketing 
and Community-Led Total Sanitation, suggests greater 
emphasis on financing sanitation promotion and the 
enabling environment (software), with limited but smarter 
subsidies for hardware where required . Mehta and 
Knapp (2004) show the potential benefits of improved 
subsidy design in terms of the additional funding that 
could be leveraged (see Figure	2) . 
Increased leveraging requires a shift in funding away from 
direct or infrastructure subsidies to alternatives such 
as subsidized credit, support for small-scale providers, 
and better, smarter funding for public elements of the 
sanitation system . In an environment of scarce resources, 
public funds go further if they are targeted in ways that 
encourage investments from other sources (for example, 
funding for wastewater treatment facilities can be 
associated with contracting arrangements that encourage 
cost efficiency and responsible user charges from utility 
service providers) . Leveraging requires an understanding 
of what households themselves are willing and able to 
invest . It can potentially unleash new sources of funds and 
at the same time empower communities and households 
to take control of their own development . It can also free 
up scarce public funds to be spent on essentials such as 
salaries and travel costs for health extensionists working 
in the remotest areas . Rather than being anti-poor such a 
shift in emphasis can enable a significant step change in 
access for the most excluded groups . 
SUBSidiES AS A dEViCE To ACHiEVE 
EqUiTY
////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
Subsidies can be used to remove inequities but this may 
not always mean that the subsidy must be delivered in the 
form of a free service to the most needy households . To 
start with: identifying the most needy households remains 
a challenge and funds are limited . There	may	not	be	
enough	money	to	provide	free	services	to	everyone	who	
needs	them . A more pragmatic approach in some cases 
would be to focus on getting everyone to make the first 
small steps towards improved hygiene . Where coverage 
is very low this type of approach shows great promise . 
CLTS has been highly effective in some countries in 
getting a significant number of people to take these first 
steps . In other situations, more elaborate interventions 
may still be needed – to increase the range of goods and 
services on offer for example, or to bring down the costs 
of safe disposal of faecal sludge . 
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figure 2: moving from hardware subsidies to promotion and leveraging
A FlEXiBlE iNFoRMATioN-BASEd 
APPRoACH
////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
In the final analysis there is no single ‘right’ answer to 
the design of financing arrangements for sanitation . 
Objectives vary with national priorities, with geography, 
with social conditions and health conditions and over 
time . The argument put forward here is that the design 
of financing arrangements (including subsidies in all their 
forms) should be based on sound empirical evidence and 
clear policy objectives . Investing in this type of informed 
policy debate up front may result in a much more efficient 
use of scarce public funds and ultimately, better access 
to sanitation for all . 
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glossary
amortising A financial arrangement whereby a payment for a service 
or repayment of a debt is spread over a series of payments . 
Interest may be added in some cases . 
Community-Led	Total	
Sanitation
An approach used in rural areas that ignites a process of 
behaviour change across the entire community to eliminate 
the practice of open defecation .
Condominial	sewers A small-bore shallow sewer usually laid in the back garden or 
lane of a group of houses with significantly lower capital and 
operating costs when compared with conventional sewers .
Consumption	subsidy A subsidy delivered to the consumers of a service having the 
effect of reducing the price of that service below it’s cost of 
production .
Crowding	out The effect of reducing financial flows from one or more 
sectors (typically private and market sources) because of 
financing from another sector (typically the public sector) .
Direct	subsidy A subsidy paid to the household or individual which in the 
form of cash, tax breaks or vouchers which can then be used 
either to pay for anything or for a specified set of goods and 
services .
Enabling	environment The policies, laws, organisations, people and skills required to 
deliver a sanitation program . 
Environmental	
sanitation
The management of human excreta, greywater, sullage 
water, stormwater drainage, solid waste and industrial and 
agricultural waste products .
Externality An effect felt in the wider community as a result of an 
individual or community action . 
Faecal	Sludge	
Management
The management of feacal sludge from latrine pits, septic 
tanks and cess pits, including its removal, carriage, treatment 
and disposal .
Hygiene	behaviour	
change
The process of changing core behaviours, usually 
handwashing and relating hygiene activities .
IEC Information, Education, Communication – the name often 
given to the materials and media activities that are used in 
hygiene promotion programmes .
Infrastructure	subsidy A subsidy which pays for specific infrastructure to be 
constructed, usually household latrines or urban sewerage 
and wastewater treatment .
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Leveraging The effect of using one source of funds (typically public money) 
to increase funding from another sector (typically private or 
market sources) .
Merit	good Something with a perceived value to society higher than the 
value placed on it by individuals .
operating	subsidy A subsidy delivered to cover the operating costs of a 
department or utility .
oDa Official Development Assistance – funds flowing to 
governments from bilateral and multilateral sources .
output-based	subsidy A subsidy delivered ex poste on delivery of an agreed output 
(usually a working service) .
Perverse	Incentive An incentive (encouragement) to act in a way that does not 
contribute to agreed goals .
Public	good A good or service whose benefits can be enjoyed by an 
individual without reducing their utility to other individuals and 
from whose benefits individuals cannot be excluded .
Sanitation The collection, transport, treatment and disposal or reuse of 
human excreta, domestic wastewater and solid waste, and 
associated hygiene promotion .
Sanitation	marketing The process of analyzing the supply and demand for 
sanitation and a set of interventions designed to improve 
either or both .
Sanitation	programme The institutions, organisations, arrangements, funding, 
staffing and financing required to deliver sanitation in its 
broadest sense, including the enabling environment, hygiene 
behaviour change, sanitation marketing, public infrastructure 
and services, and private infrastructure and services . 
Sanitation	system The technical infrastructure required to achieve collection, 
transport, treatment, disposal or re-use of waste .
Small	bore	sewers See condominial sewers .
Software The set of activities relating to improving sanitation which 
do not comprise the construction and use of infrastructure . 
Generally software includes the enabling environment, hygiene 
behaviour change and sanitation marketing .
Twin-pit	Pour-flush	
latrine	(TPPL)
A latrine having a water seal and two unsealed pits which can 
be used alternately such that waste in one pit decomposes 
before it is required to be emptied and re-used .
utility	company/
provider
A company which may be privately- or publicly-owned having 
responsibility to deliver utility services, in this case usually 
water and/or sewerage and/or other sanitation services .
Ventilated	Improved	
Pit	Latrine	(VIP)
A latrine which reduces fly and odour nuisance through use 
of a darkened superstructure or pit cover to prevent light 
entering the pit, and a screened vent pipe to remove odours 
and prevent fly-maggots from emerging .
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>> Introduction
WHAT NEEdS To BE FiNANCEd?
////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
The total cost of a sanitation programme comprises:
w	 Supporting	and	developing	an	enabling	environment:	
These could include expenditures linked to policy 
development, capacity building, knowledge sharing or 
coordination . However, it may be difficult to estimate 
those costs other than by taking a percentage of 
overhead costs for staff working on policy development 
at the sector level, either within the Government or 
within donors .
w	 Hygiene	behaviour	change	activities: This would 
include hygiene education and mobilization activities 
in schools, communities and households, social 
marketing for handwashing with soap, interventions in 
the design of school curricula and teacher training, etc .
w	 Sanitation	marketing	costs: market assessments, 
demand promotion, costs of community-led total 
sanitation activities, interventions to stimulate supply 
of appropriate goods and services (e .g . training or 
financial support to private providers), etc .
w	 Cost	of	public	infrastructure	and	services	(capital	
and	operational	costs)	of for example schools, public 
toilets, shared network services; and
w	 Cost	of	private	infrastructure	and	services	(capital	
and	operational	costs) of household sanitation .
Adequate funding is needed for all the elements of the 
programme . For example, if investments are urgently 
needed in sanitation for schools, public latrines in market 
places, and hygiene promotion programmes, these are 
areas which, almost by definition, need financial support 
from public sources or explicit policy support to generate 
private funding (for privately constructed and managed 
public latrines, for example) . 
In addition the long-term or	lifespan	financing of 
sanitation is critically important . While much debate 
focuses on provision of new toilets the real challenge is in 
ensuring that they are properly used and managed in the 
long run .
Only once the financial structure of the whole programme 
over the long term has been established, will it be 
possible to judge whether financial support to household 
investments is appropriate or can be provided from 
available sources .
At the same time sanitation goods and services may be 
provided by a range of different providers including:
w	 central government;
w regional/local/urban government;
w large scale private sector;
w the community (often with support from an NGO or 
CBO);
w small-scale private sector; and
w the household through direct provision 3 .
To avoid distorting existing arrangements for service 
provision which may be working very well, the design of 
public financing of sanitation also needs to be cognizant 
of these multiple service providers and not assume that 
all provision is taking place in the public sector .
WHERE do THE FUNdS CoME FRoM?
////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
The funds for the provision of sanitation goods and 
services come from only three sources:
w	 Public	funds, flowing through central or local 
government and raised through general taxation, 
public borrowing and ODA;
w  Private	funds, flowing directly between beneficiary 
households and service providers; and
w  Semi-public/charitable	fundsflowing in the form 
of payments made to communities, households or 
service providers by donors, foundations and other 
non-governmental organizations . 
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Public funding for saniTaTion: 
THe many faces 
of saniTaTion subsidies 
Access to safe sanitation would, for some 2 .5 billion fellow citizens without it, improve 
their health, dignity, local environment and economic well-being . While most people would 
agree that the poor and vulnerable should be supported to obtain sani ation services in 
ways that promote social equity, are people-centred, participatory and affordable, the 
debate on how to do it often becomes contentious . Some people propose infrastructure-
based hardware subsides; others oppose them . As Public Funding for Sanitation explains, 
the discussion on appropriate sanitation financing mechanisms for the poor goes far 
beyond the use of hardware subsidies . It must take into account aspects of hardware 
and oftware, capital and operational expenditure, the type of sanitation system b ing 
built, and, ultimately, the users of the sanitation system . This primer assists the reader 
in understanding the global debate on subsidies and sanitation financing, and provides 
guidance on how to select the most appropriate funding arrangements for sanitation 
programming in different situations .
